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835 
THE END OF BORDENKIRCHER:  
EXTENDING THE LOGIC OF APPRENDI  
TO PLEA BARGAINING 
MICHAEL M. O’HEAR∗ 
Although the Supreme Court approved of the use of charging threats 
nearly thirty years ago in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, a more recent line of 
cases has subtly undermined key premises of that landmark decision. In 
order to induce guilty pleas, prosecutors might use any of a number of 
different tactics. A prosecutor might, for instance, charge aggressively in 
the first instance and then promise to drop the most serious charges in 
return for a guilty plea to a lesser offense. Bordenkircher addressed the 
mirror-image of this tactic: the prosecutor filed relatively minor charges 
at first, but then threatened to pursue more serious charges if the 
defendant did not plead guilty. The Supreme Court approved of such 
charging threats based on two considerations: the efficiency benefits of 
resolving cases by plea instead of jury trial, and the possibility that 
prosecutors would evade a ban on threats by charging more aggressively 
in the first instance. The Court’s reasoning, however, is inconsistent with 
Apprendi v. New Jersey and its progeny. Apprendi rejected the use of both 
efficiency considerations and evasion concerns as grounds for impairing 
access to juries. Apprendi instead emphasized a need for robust checks 
and balances within the criminal justice system. Because the Apprendi line 
of cases addressed sentencing procedures, not plea bargaining, their 
relevance to Bordenkircher has thus far escaped notice. The Article 
argues, however, that the Court should now overturn Bordenkircher in 
light of the values it embraced in Apprendi. The Article also proposes a 
new test for evaluating the constitutionality of charging threats. 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes is an iconic case from the era when plea 
bargaining finally emerged from the shadows and acquired clear 
constitutional legitimacy.1 In 1973, a Kentucky grand jury indicted Paul 
 
 
 ∗ Associate Professor, Marquette University Law School. J.D., Yale Law School; B.A., Yale 
College. Editor, Federal Sentencing Reporter. I am grateful for comments on an earlier draft by Daniel 
Capra, Jason Czarnezki, Nora Demleitner, Rick Garnett, Erik Luna, Dan Markel, Scott Moss, Chad 
Oldfather, Mark Osler, Stephanie Stern, Sandra Guerra Thompson, and Ronald Wright. I am also 
grateful for comments from workshop participants at the University of St. Thomas School of Law.  
 1. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (rejecting constitutional rule “that 
would drive the practice of plea bargaining back into the shadows from which it has so recently 
emerged”). For a leading history of plea bargaining from its first systematic use in the nineteenth 
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Hayes on a charge of uttering a forged instrument in the amount of $88.30, 
an offense punishable by two to ten years in prison.2 During plea 
negotiations, the prosecutor offered to recommend a term of five years if 
Hayes pled guilty, but, otherwise, threatened to charge Hayes under the 
Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act, which would subject Hayes to a 
mandatory life term based on his two prior felony convictions.3 When 
Hayes rejected the deal, he was charged as threatened.4 Eventually, he lost 
at trial and was sentenced pursuant to the Act.5 Thus, for his decision to go 
to trial, Hayes suffered an extraordinary penalty, as his sentence ballooned 
from about five years to life.  
The case created a dilemma when it reached the Supreme Court. On the 
one hand, as the Court had established in a recent line of cases, “[t]o 
punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do 
is a due process violation of the most basic sort . . . .”6 Because Hayes 
indisputably had a constitutional right to his jury trial, the prosecutor’s 
decision to penalize him in such a severe fashion for exercising the right 
was troubling at the very least.  
On the other hand, in another recent line of cases, the Court had 
endorsed the guilty plea and plea bargain as “important components of this 
country’s criminal justice system.”7 A ruling in favor of Hayes might 
bring down the whole edifice. The Court could see no principled means of 
distinguishing among plea inducements: a “threat” (like the prosecutor’s 
threat to charge Hayes as a recidivist) could easily be restructured as an 
“offer” (e.g., the prosecutor might have charged Hayes as a recidivist from 
the outset and then offered to dismiss the charge if Hayes pled guilty to the 
underlying offense). Thus, if the Court were to prohibit charging threats, 
the Court could not stop there, but would have to regulate all plea 
inducements—a radical step the Court was unwilling to make.8 
Accordingly, the Court rejected Hayes’s claim.9 
 
 
century to the present, see GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA 
BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003). 
 2. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 358. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 359. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 363 (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 738 (1969)). 
 7. Id. at 361 (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977)). 
 8. See id. at 364 (“While confronting a defendant with the risk of more severe punishment 
clearly may have a discouraging effect on the defendant’s assertion of his trial rights, the imposition of 
these difficult choices is an inevitable—and permissible—attribute of any system which tolerates and 
encourages the negotiation of pleas.” (quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted)). 
 9. Id. at 365. 
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Beyond its immediate significance in affirming the constitutionality of 
one particular type of plea inducement, Bordenkircher has become 
emblematic of judicial acquiescence to the modern plea bargaining system 
in which prosecutors are permitted to exercise broad discretion in 
determining how to extract guilty pleas.10 In recent years, this system has 
come under bitter attack for giving too much power to prosecutors and 
creating too great a risk of wrongful convictions.11 Critics have not 
observed, however, that a recent line of Supreme Court decisions casts 
doubt on crucial premises of Bordenkircher, and thereby creates a new 
opportunity for constitutionally-based regulation of some of the most 
objectionable forms of plea bargaining.  
More specifically, through its decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey12 
and its progeny,13 the Court has rejuvenated the Sixth Amendment right to 
a jury trial. Even though these decisions dealt with sentencing procedures, 
not plea bargaining, they have nonetheless undercut Bordenkircher in at 
least two respects. First, and most obviously, Apprendi’s vision of a robust 
role for the jury in the criminal justice system is inconsistent with 
Bordenkircher’s endorsement of guilty pleas as the most desirable method 
of resolving criminal cases. Second, and more subtly, the Apprendi 
decisions recognize the significance of the form of a government action. 
Two different government actions producing the same result may be 
perceived quite differently based on differences in their form. The Court’s 
reasoning in this regard, which resonates with recent work in cognitive 
psychology and philosophy, points the way to a principled distinction 
between threats and offers. 
Building on these observations, the central thesis of this Article is 
easily stated: in the interests of jurisprudential consistency, the five 
Justices constituting the majority in Apprendi—all of whom remain on the 
Roberts Court—should, if given the opportunity, vote to overturn 
 
 
 10. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: Plea Bargaining and the Decline of the 
Rule of Law, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 351, 379 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) 
(“[Bordenkircher] does bear some responsibility for the punitive turn America’s criminal justice 
system has taken—for its harshness, for the sheer magnitude of our two-million-plus inmate 
population. Also for the inexorable rise of plea bargaining . . . .”). 
 11. See, e.g., id.; Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the 
Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 409–10 (2001) (discussing risk that prosecutors may use 
power in biased manner); Marc L. Miller, Domination and Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 
56 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1215 (2004) (discussing “excessive” prosecutorial power in the federal 
system). 
 12. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 13. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 
296 (2004); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
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Bordenkircher.14 The thesis is considerably easier to state than to defend, 
if for no other reason than that the only member of the “Apprendi Five” 
who was on the Court in 1978 (Justice Stevens) actually voted with the 
majority in Bordenkircher. Yet, as we will see, Stevens subtly backed 
away from Bordenkircher in a later opinion,15 and good arguments may be 
made that he should now reject even his watered-down version of 
Bordenkircher as inconsistent with his Apprendi writings. 
In order to make these arguments, we shall have to puzzle over one of 
the ongoing points of controversy surrounding the Apprendi decisions: 
whether the decisions constitute, as Justice O’Connor dismissively 
characterized them, “doctrinaire formalism.”16 The question has attracted a 
growing body of scholarly commentary.17 I will attempt to illuminate the 
issues by distinguishing between two types of formalism and two types of 
consequentialism. First, I distinguish “rule-structure formalism” from 
 
 
 14. While I argue that the Court ought to reject one particular form of plea inducement, I do not 
seek in this Article to join the long-standing academic debate over the merits of plea bargaining 
generally. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: 
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 932–34 (1983) (summarizing 
arguments against plea bargaining); Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 
12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 309 (1983) (“[P]lea bargaining is desirable, not just defensible, if the system 
attempts to maximize deterrence from a given commitment of resources.”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, 
Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1979 (1992) (“[P]lea bargaining seriously impairs 
the public interest in effective punishment of crime and in accurate separation of the guilty from the 
innocent.”); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 
1910 (1992) (“Properly understood, classical contract theory supports the freedom to bargain over 
criminal punishment.”). 
 15. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982). See infra Part I.B. 
 16. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 321 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). O’Connor doubtlessly has in mind here 
the sort of rigid formalism that dominated American legal thinking a century ago and that was the 
subject of relentless attacks by the Legal Realists. See Erik Luna, Gridland: An Allegorical Critique of 
Federal Sentencing, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 25, 89–93 (2005). 
 17. Most commentators on this issue have echoed O’Connor’s criticism. See, e.g., Ronald J. 
Allen & Ethan A. Hastert, From Winship to Apprendi to Booker: Constitutional Command or 
Constitutional Blunder?, 58 STAN. L. REV. 195, 202 (2005) (“To the extent what emerges from the 
[Apprendi] cases is something other than drafting advice, it will most likely redound to the detriment 
of defendants, a curious result in a line of cases ostensibly designed to protect defendants’ rights.”); 
Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, 
the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 186 (2005) (“[Justice Scalia] has done 
a disservice in Blakely . . . by exalting formalism so far above humility, practicality, and plain old 
common sense.”); Frank O. Bowman, III, Function Over Formalism: A Provisional Theory of the 
Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment, 17 FED. SENT’G REP. 1, 2 (2004) (criticizing “narrow 
formalism” of Blakely); Susan N. Herman, Applying Apprendi to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: 
You Say You Want a Revolution?, 87 IOWA L. REV. 615, 638 (2002) (characterizing Apprendi as 
“highly formalistic”); Jeffrey Standen, The End of the Era of Sentencing Guidelines: Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 87 IOWA L. REV. 775, 783 (2002) (“[T]he Court will not be able, through formalistic attacks 
from the fringe, to diminish the preeminent discretion of the legislature to define crimes.”). For a more 
positive view, see Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1486 
(2001) (“[T]he formalism of Apprendi is not pointless after all.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss4/2
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“consequence-indifference formalism.” The former principle indicates 
that, in establishing the boundaries of legal rights and duties, courts ought 
to favor bright-line tests over vague standards.18 The latter indicates that 
courts ought to decide cases based on some facially neutral principle, like 
plain textual meaning or original intent, without regard to the real-world 
consequences of the decision. It is this type of formalism that Justice 
O’Connor had in mind with her criticism of Apprendi. However, while the 
Apprendi Five undoubtedly employ rule-structure formalism, they just as 
clearly believe they are doing something that materially enhances the 
fairness and democratic accountability of the criminal justice system. And 
because these beliefs are at least plausible, the Apprendi decisions should 
not be dismissed as indifferent to consequences. 
I further distinguish between “rational-actor consequentialism” and 
“biased-actor consequentialism.” Any attempt to consider real-world 
consequences in judicial decisionmaking must rely on some basic 
assumptions about the way that people behave in the real world. Law and 
economics scholars have long employed rational-actor models to predict 
the social consequences of changes in legal rules. These models assume 
that people seek to maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences 
and accumulate an optimal amount of information in order to do so.19 A 
competing approach, sometimes labeled behavioral law and economics 
(“BLE”), relaxes these assumptions and attempts to take into account how 
“‘real people’ differ from homo economicus.”20 Of particular note, the 
“real people” of BLE exhibit various forms of cognitive bias such as loss 
aversion, that is, the tendency to weigh losses more heavily than gains.21  
As we will see, the consequentialism of the Bordenkircher majority 
rests on rational-actor assumptions, while the Bordenkircher dissenters 
implicitly assume biased actors.22 In the Apprendi decisions, these roles 
are reversed: the majority employs biased-actor consequentialism, while 
the dissenters adhere to the rational-actor model. These different premises 
are not acknowledged in any of the cases, but they are readily teased out 
and help to explain how it is that all of the Justices seem to be claiming 
the consequentialist high ground. 
 
 
 18. See Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 749, 755 (2006) (contrasting rules and standards). 
 19. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476 (1998) (citing GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH 
TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976)). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 1484.  
 22. Infra Part III.B. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The Article proceeds as follows: Part I elaborates on the Bordenkircher 
dilemma, identifying the competing approaches to resolving the dilemma 
taken by the various majority and dissenting opinions in Bordenkircher 
and an important follow-up case, United States v. Goodwin.23 Part II 
discusses a parallel dilemma addressed by the Apprendi line of cases: to 
what extent should the Court defer to legislative decisions about which 
facts in a criminal case are “elements” (the determination of which 
implicates the full range of criminal procedure protections) and which 
facts are mere sentencing considerations (as to which procedures may be 
far more relaxed)? Countering Justice O’Connor’s charge of “doctrinaire 
formalism,” I suggest a consequentialist account of the Apprendi line of 
cases, in which they can be seen through the lens of BLE as advancing 
democratic, libertarian, and fairness values in the criminal justice 
system.24 Part III brings together the Bordenkircher and Apprendi lines of 
cases, detailing their inconsistencies. In Part IV, I propose a new rule of 
constitutional law that the Apprendi Five should adopt if given a fresh 
opportunity to address the issue of prosecutorial charging threats. Under 
this rule, prosecutors would be prohibited from carrying through on threats 
made after formal charging that have the effect of increasing the 
defendant’s sentencing exposure.25 The test is consistent with the rule-
structure formalism of Apprendi, while also taking more seriously the 
jury-trial right than the rules adopted in Bordenkircher and Goodwin do.26 
I. THE BORDENKIRCHER DILEMMA 
Prosecutors often seek to induce guilty pleas by offering defendants a 
benefit in return for their plea, such as the dismissal of one charge in 
exchange for a plea to a lesser included offense. Bordenkircher, though, 
involved a different sort of inducement: a threat to bring a greater charge. 
The case presented a dilemma for the Court because it represented a 
collision between two established principles. On the one hand, the 
“vindictiveness” principle, adopted by the Court in such cases as 
Blackledge v. Perry,27 forbade prosecutors and judges from penalizing 
defendants for the exercise of procedural rights. But, on the other hand, the 
Court had also recently come to recognize the important social benefits of 
 
 
 23. 457 U.S. 368 (1982). 
 24. Infra Part II.D. 
 25. Infra Part IV.A. 
 26. Infra Part IV.B. 
 27. 417 U.S. 21 (1974). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss4/2
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guilty pleas and plea-bargaining, which facilitated the efficient resolution 
of cases and created opportunities for defendants to receive more lenient 
treatment.28  
To be more specific, the Bordenkircher dilemma involved at least three 
difficult, overlapping questions. First, should the law distinguish between 
threats of harsh treatment and offers of lenient treatment when, at least in 
principle, threats could be easily restructured as offers? Second, how much 
weight should be given to the social benefits of the plea-inducement 
system? (This question was especially pressing if threats were 
indistinguishable from offers, in which case Paul Hayes’s claim might call 
into question all forms of plea inducement.) And, third, if defendants did 
have some sort of constitutional protection from unduly coercive plea 
inducements, how exactly would the right be structured? 
The three opinions in Bordenkircher (a majority opinion by Justice 
Stewart and dissents by Justices Blackmun and Powell) suggest three 
different ways to resolve the tripartite dilemma. This Part considers each 
of the opinions, then assesses the majority and dissenting opinions in 
Goodwin. Although Goodwin did not involve a prosecutorial charging 
threat, the opinions nonetheless addressed the meaning of Bordenkircher 
at some length. Indeed, the Goodwin majority opinion (authored by Justice 
Stevens, a member of the Apprendi Five) characterized Bordenkircher in 
terms that were startlingly similar to Justice Powell’s dissent in the earlier 
case. Meanwhile, Justice Brennan’s dissent in Goodwin suggests a fourth 
approach to resolving the Bordenkircher dilemma—the one that turns out 
to be the closest in spirit to the Apprendi decisions. 
A. Bordenkircher 
1. Majority Opinion: A Rule of Non-Interference with Plea 
Inducements 
In the majority’s view, Bordenkircher’s outcome resulted inevitably 
from the social desirability of plea inducements. The majority saw no 
meaningful distinction between threats and offers,29 and so framed 
Hayes’s argument as an attack on plea inducements generally.30 Observing 
 
 
 28. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 361 (1978) (discussing benefits of plea-
bargaining). 
 29. Id. at 363. 
 30. See id. at 364–65 (“To hold that the prosecutors’ desire to induce a guilty plea is an 
‘unjustifiable standard,’ which . . . may play no part in his charging decision, would contradict the very 
premises that underlie the concept of plea-bargaining itself.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 835 Ohear book pages.doc8/31/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
842 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:835 
 
 
 
 
that “the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are important 
components of this country’s criminal justice system,”31 the majority 
could find no fault in a prosecutor’s desire to secure a plea using his broad 
charging discretion,32 so long as the minimal requirements of probable 
cause were satisfied.33 The majority acknowledged that the threat of more 
severe punishment “may have a discouraging effect on the defendant’s 
assertion of his trial rights,” but nonetheless concluded that “the 
imposition of these difficult choices [is] an inevitable—and permissible—
attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the 
negotiation of pleas.”34 The majority thus suggested no circumstances in 
which a prosecutor’s filing of otherwise permissible charges pursuant to a 
plea-inducement threat would raise constitutional problems. 
2. Blackmun’s Dissent: Questioning the Legitimacy of the Plea-
Inducement Motive 
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, found the 
vindictiveness principle controlling. Notwithstanding the unquestioned 
social benefits of guilty pleas, Blackmun argued that it was 
unconstitutional for a prosecutor purposely to impose a penalty on a 
defendant as a result of the defendant’s decision to contest the prosecutor’s 
case at trial.35 In order to protect defendants from vindictiveness, he 
proposed a burden-shifting test that focused on the prosecutor’s intent: 
[W]hen plea negotiations, conducted in the face of the less serious 
charge under the first indictment, fail, charging by a second 
indictment a more serious crime for the same conduct creates a 
‘strong inference’ of vindictiveness. . . . I . . . do not understand why 
. . . due process does not require that the prosecution justify its 
action on some basis other than discouraging [the defendant] from 
the exercise of his right to a trial.36 
 
 
 31. Id. at 361 (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977)). 
 32. See id. at 364 (“[B]y tolerating and encouraging the negotiation of pleas, this Court has 
necessarily accepted as constitutionally legitimate the simple reality that the prosecutor’s interest at the 
bargaining table is to persuade the defendant to forgo his right to plead not guilty.”). 
 33. See id. (“[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused 
committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to 
file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”). 
 34. Id. at 364 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 35. Id. at 367 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 36. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss4/2
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Blackmun recognized that his approach might cause prosecutors to 
restructure threats as offers.37 In other words, rather than employ a “low-
to-high” charging strategy, some prosecutors might switch to “high-to-
low.” Blackmun further recognized that judges would not be able to detect 
and sanction such “overcharging.”38 Yet, Blackmun believed it was 
preferable for prosecutors to employ high-to-low rather than low-to-high; 
the switch would protect those defendants who were most determined to 
go to trial from the most severe reprisals, facilitate public oversight of 
plea-inducement practices, and give defendants a fairer chance to 
challenge the enhanced charges.39 Blackmun, in short, concluded that 
there were meaningful differences between threats and offers.40 
3. Powell’s Dissent: Deference with a Difference 
Justice Powell staked out the middle ground. On the one hand, he 
agreed with the majority that plea inducements are “essential to the 
functioning of the criminal justice system,” and that, in general, 
prosecutors should be “accorded the widest discretion” in attempting to 
secure pleas.41 He was unwilling, however, to endorse the majority’s view 
that prosecutors had an entirely free hand to enhance charges in response 
to a defendant’s failure to plead guilty. At some point, the new charge 
might become “unreasonable and not in the public interest,”42 and it was at 
that point that Powell would join Blackmun in condemning the 
prosecutor’s motives. Put differently, the prosecutor’s desire to penalize 
the exercise of trial rights was immaterial as long as the resulting charges 
were also justified by society’s legitimate interest in punishing the 
defendant’s underlying criminal conduct; however, “[i]mplementation of a 
strategy calculated solely to deter the exercise of constitutional rights is 
not a constitutionally permissible exercise of discretion.”43  
Powell thus proposed a test that focused not on whether the prosecutor 
wished to penalize the defendant’s exercise of a right, but on “whether the 
prosecutor reasonably might have charged the [defendant with the new 
crime] in the first place.”44 On the unique facts of Bordenkircher, where 
 
 
 37. Id. at 368 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 38. Id. at 368 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 39. Id.  
 40. Infra Part III.B. 
 41. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 372–73 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 42. Id. at 371 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 43. Id. at 373 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 44. Id. at 370 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the defendant was subject to a life sentence for an eighty-eight-dollar 
crime, Powell concluded that the charges were not reasonable.45 Thus, 
although Powell’s approach was more deferential to prosecutors than 
Blackmun’s, Powell would have imposed some limitations on prosecutors 
in “exceptional case[s].”46 
B. Goodwin 
Following an altercation with a police officer, Learley Reed Goodwin 
was charged with several misdemeanor and petty offenses.47 After plea 
negotiations failed, the case was transferred to another prosecutor, who 
obtained a felony indictment, thus exposing Goodwin to more severe 
punishment.48 Convicted at trial, Goodwin argued on appeal that 
prosecutors had unconstitutionally retaliated against him for invoking his 
right to a jury trial.49 The claim, however, was rejected by the Supreme 
Court. 
Although Goodwin did not arise from an express threat, the case merits 
our attention for three reasons. First, because the Court’s analysis turned 
on the scope of the Bordenkircher exception to prior vindictiveness law, 
Goodwin contains much commentary on the earlier decision. Second, the 
Goodwin majority opinion was authored by Justice Stevens, who later 
became a key figure in the Apprendi cases. Finally, the dissent, authored 
by Justice Brennan and joined by Justice Marshall, suggests a fourth 
distinct approach to vindictiveness. 
1. Majority Opinion: Powell’s Triumph? 
The majority relied on Bordenkircher in rejecting Goodwin’s claim, 
but, in doing so, confronted an important difficulty: although 
Bordenkircher turned on a perceived need to preserve the plea-inducement 
system, Goodwin’s claim presented no direct challenge to the system.50 
Justice Stevens’s solution was to recharacterize Bordenkircher, not as a 
case about the benefits of plea inducements, but as a case about the 
benefits of broad prosecutorial charging discretion. That maneuver 
 
 
 45. Id. at 370–71 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 46. Id. at 372 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 47. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 370 (1982). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 372. 
 50. See id. at 383 (characterizing Goodwin’s claim as a claim of retaliation for invoking jury-trial 
rights as opposed to going to trial per se). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss4/2
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addressed one difficulty, but opened another: how to account for 
Blackledge v. Perry, the leading pre-Bordenkircher case on prosecutorial 
vindictiveness, in which the Court had rejected a prosecutor’s 
enhancement of charges following a defendant’s exercise of his right to a 
retrial.51 In light of Blackledge, charging discretion was clearly not 
unlimited. In order to harmonize Blackledge with his take on 
Bordenkircher, Stevens borrowed some from Blackmun’s dissent in 
Bordenkircher and much from Powell’s. Lending support to this view of 
Goodwin, Powell, alone among the four Bordenkircher dissenters, actually 
joined the majority opinion. 
Stevens endorsed the constitutional principle on which Blackledge was 
based (an individual “may not be punished for exercising a protected 
statutory or constitutional right”52), but saw the real difficulty as one of 
proof. How could the courts distinguish between “governmental action 
that is fully justified as a legitimate response to perceived criminal 
conduct” and “governmental action that is an impermissible response to 
noncriminal, protected activity”?53 This is where Stevens borrowed from 
Blackmun, specifically, by structuring the regulation of prosecutorial 
discretion through a system of presumptions and burden-shifting. Thus, 
Blackledge, in Stevens’s account, had established a rebuttable presumption 
of vindictiveness based on increased charges in its particular post-trial 
setting.54 
In Bordenkircher, by contrast, “the Court for the first time considered 
an allegation of vindictiveness that arose in a pretrial setting,”55 and 
“made clear that the mere fact that a defendant refuses to plead guilty and 
forces the government to prove its case is insufficient to warrant a 
presumption that subsequent changes in the charging decision are 
unjustified.”56 Stevens felt that prosecutors could generally be trusted to 
charge reasonably and without an improper motive to punish or deter the 
exercise of procedural rights: 
There is good reason to be cautious before adopting an inflexible 
presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in a pretrial setting. In 
the course of preparing a case for trial, the prosecutor may uncover 
additional information that suggests a basis for further prosecution 
 
 
 51. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30–31 (1974). 
 52. Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 372. 
 53. Id. at 373. 
 54. Id. at 376. 
 55. Id. at 377 (emphasis added). 
 56. Id. at 382–83. 
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or he simply may come to realize that information possessed by the 
State has a broader significance. . . . 
. . . A prosecutor should remain free before trial to exercise the 
broad discretion entrusted to him to determine the extent of the 
societal interest in prosecution.57 
Stevens thus indicated that the key difference between Blackledge and 
Bordenkircher was not the plea-inducement context (as the dissenters 
asserted), but their post-trial versus pretrial settings. Vindictiveness might 
be presumed in at least some post-trial contexts, but it would never be 
presumed where charges were increased pretrial. 
Stevens’s reluctance, like Powell’s, to presume that prosecutors act 
with improper motives differentiates his approach from Blackmun’s. At 
the same time, there are real differences (albeit subtle and 
unacknowledged) between Stevens’s opinion for the Court in Goodwin 
and Stewart’s opinion for the Court in Bordenkircher. In particular, 
Bordenkircher recognized no apparent limitation on the prosecutor’s 
discretion in pressuring defendants to plead guilty; as long as the charge is 
supported by probable cause, the prosecutor can use it.58 (Indeed, as 
Powell had suggested, it is hard to imagine a much clearer case of actual 
vindictiveness than Bordenkircher itself, in which the prosecutor sought a 
life sentence for an eighty-eight-dollar crime and made quite clear that he 
did so as a result of Hayes’s refusal to plead guilty to the lesser crime.59) 
By contrast, Stevens in Goodwin stated: 
In declining to apply a presumption of vindictiveness, we of course 
do not foreclose the possibility that a defendant in an appropriate 
case might prove objectively that the prosecutor’s charging decision 
was motivated by a desire to punish him for doing something that 
the law plainly allows him to do.60 
How might this improper motivation be proven in the absence of a 
presumption? According to Goodwin, Bordenkircher established that the 
prosecutor’s stated intent to induce a guilty plea was not enough: “The fact 
that the prosecutor threatened the defendant did not prove that the action 
threatened was not permissible; the prosecutor’s conduct did not establish 
that the additional charges were brought solely to “penalize” the defendant 
 
 
 57. Id. at 381–82. 
 58.  Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). 
 59.  Id. at 371, 372–73 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 60. Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 384. 
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and could not be justified as a proper exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion.”61 
Put differently, “mixed motives” were inadequate. “A charging 
decision does not levy an improper ‘penalty’ unless it results solely from 
the defendant’s exercise of a protected legal right, rather than the 
prosecutor’s normal assessment of the societal interest in prosecution.”62 
Thus, the burden on the defendant was not to show an intent to induce a 
guilty plea, but to show an intent to induce a guilty plea using charges that 
“could not be justified as a proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”63 
Goodwin thus contemplated that vindictiveness claims would be built 
around a showing that charges exceeded “the extent of the societal interest 
in prosecution.”64 This is, of course, precisely the inquiry that Powell 
advocated in his Bordenkircher dissent. Little wonder that he parted ways 
with his fellow Bordenkircher dissenters to join the Goodwin majority! 
2. Brennan’s Dissent: The Likelihood-of-Deterrence Test 
In Brennan’s view, Bordenkircher was limited to the particular 
circumstances of a prosecutor carrying through on a threat made during 
plea negotiations.65 Outside that context, the vindictiveness analysis turned 
on the questions considered by the pre-Bordenkircher vindictiveness 
cases: “Did the elevation of the charges against [the defendant] pose a 
realistic likelihood of vindictiveness? Is it possible that the ‘fear of such 
vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter’ a person in [the defendant’s] 
position from exercising his statutory and constitutional right to a jury 
trial?”66 And, as Brennan saw it, the government’s elevation of charges 
against Goodwin did indeed pose such “a realistic likelihood of 
vindictiveness.”67 
Thus, under Brennan’s test, the analysis depended not on the 
prosecutor’s actual motive, but, rather, on how the prosecutor’s actions 
might realistically be viewed by a defendant.68 Even though Brennan had 
joined Blackmun’s dissent in Bordenkircher, his opinion in Goodwin 
 
 
 61. Id. at 380 n.12. 
 62. Id. at 380 n.11 (emphasis added). 
 63. Id. at 380 n.12 (emphasis added). 
 64. Id. at 382. 
 65. Id. at 391 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 66. Id. at 389–90 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 67. Id. at 390 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 68. See id. at 389 (arguing that Blackledge “focused upon the accused’s apprehension of . . . 
retaliatory motivation”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).  
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actually went a step further inasmuch as Blackmun would have given the 
prosecutor an opportunity to rebut a presumption of vindictiveness by 
showing an absence of actual vindictive intent. (Indeed, as if to underscore 
the point, Blackmun did not join Brennan’s dissent in Goodwin, but wrote 
a concurring opinion.69) In Part IV, I will discuss how Brennan’s approach 
might be translated into the express threat setting. 
C. Summary 
While Goodwin may have muddied the waters a bit, it is still perfectly 
clear that a defendant who is penalized, like Paul Hayes, pursuant to a 
plea-inducement threat has little or no chance of prevailing on a 
vindictiveness claim. Nothing in Goodwin suggested that Bordenkircher 
was incorrectly decided on its facts, and few defendants will have facts 
nearly as compelling as those of Hayes himself. Moreover, to whatever 
extent that Powell’s slightly more flexible approach ultimately prevailed, 
recall that Powell made clear that judicial interference in the plea-
inducement process should occur “[o]nly in the most exceptional case 
. . . .”70 
Bordenkircher and Goodwin both relied on consequentialist reasoning. 
Neither, for instance, engaged in any textual exegesis or assessment of 
original intent. Rather, Bordenkircher worried about preserving the 
benefits offered by the plea-inducement system to defendants and the 
public at large, while Goodwin worried about preserving the prosecutor’s 
“free[dom] before trial to exercise the broad discretion entrusted to him to 
determine the extent of the societal interest in prosecution.”71 In light of 
their respective consequentialist concerns, both cases mandated a high 
degree of deference to prosecutorial charging decisions. 
Bordenkircher, adopting a somewhat stronger form of deference, 
employed a bright-line rule: as long as the charge was supported by 
probable cause, there was no vindictiveness problem.72 Goodwin, by 
contrast, seemed less consistent with the ideal of rule-structure formalism, 
suggesting an inquiry (could the charges “be justified as a proper exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion?”73) that implied prudential, case-by-case 
 
 
 69. Blackmun disagreed with the majority’s approach but would have nonetheless affirmed the 
conviction on the basis that the prosecutor had “dispelled the appearance of vindictiveness” in the 
case. Id. at 386 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 70. Bordenkircher v. Hays, 434 U.S. 357, 372 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 71. Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 382. 
 72.  Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364. 
 73.  Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 380 n.12. 
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balancing of interests. As we will see, the Court initially adopted, but then 
decisively rejected, just this sort of vague test as it wrestled with the 
sentencing factor problem. 
II. A PARALLEL DILEMMA: THE SCOPE OF DEFERENCE TO LEGISLATURES 
IN DEFINING THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMES 
Prior to the 1980s, sentencing in the United States was largely 
discretionary: after a defendant was convicted of a crime, the judge was 
free to select a sentence anywhere within a wide statutory range prescribed 
for the crime.74 The two- to ten-year range Paul Hayes initially faced for 
false uttering in 1973 was emblematic of such a discretionary system. By 
contrast, the Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act, with its mandatory life 
sentence for certain recidivists, was aberrational; indeed, Kentucky 
actually softened the Act while Hayes’s case was pending75—too late to 
do Hayes any good, but indicative of the times.  
Since the 1970s, however, American legislatures have adopted a host 
of mandatory minimum statutes, binding sentencing guidelines, and other 
presumptive sentencing schemes in order to curtail the discretion of 
sentencing judges.76 In such regimes, the sentence is largely dictated by 
 
 
 74. See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 225–26 (1993) (describing 
traditional federal sentencing practices). I use the term “discretionary sentencing” throughout this 
Article in order to avoid confusion surrounding the more common term “indeterminate sentencing.” 
See Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L.J. 377, 381–86 (2005) 
(discussing terminological difficulties in this area). The latter term is sometimes applied broadly to any 
sentencing regime in which judges select sentences within wide ranges, and sometimes more narrowly 
to apply only to systems in which a parole board determines the actual release date from prison. 
“Discretionary sentencing” in this Article corresponds to the broader understanding of “indeterminate 
sentencing.” The term encompasses not only traditional unguided sentencing systems, but also systems 
with “advisory” (i.e., nonbinding) sentencing guidelines. See Kim S. Hunt & Michael Connelly, 
Advisory Guidelines in the Post-Blakely Era, 17 FED. SENT’G REP. 233, 233 (2005) (noting that nine 
states and the District of Columbia employ advisory guidelines). By contrast, six states and the federal 
government had “mandatory” sentencing guidelines prior to the recent Apprendi line of cases. See id. 
at 239 n.3. 
 75. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 359 n.2. 
 76. For a more detailed description of this history and explanation of the trend, see O’Hear, 
supra note 18, at 756–91. Presumptive sentencing schemes mandate a particular sentence or narrow 
sentencing range, often based on detailed sentencing guidelines that take into account a variety of 
offense and offender characteristics. Judges must impose the presumptive sentence (or sentence within 
the presumptive range) unless particular aggravating or mitigating facts warrant a different result. Prior 
to the Apprendi decisions, thirteen states and the federal government employed presumptive 
sentencing. Don Stemen & Daniel F. Wilhelm, Finding the Jury: State Legislative Responses to 
Blakely v. Washington, 18 FED. SENT’G REP. 7, 7 (2005). Presumptive sentencing schemes (with or 
without guidelines) may be contrasted with discretionary schemes. See supra note 74. Note one final 
distinction: if a legislature wishes to single out a particular type of offense or offender for special 
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the presence of some fact or group of facts that goes beyond what is 
necessary to establish the defendant’s legal guilt. For instance, under the 
Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act, the presence of two prior felony 
convictions mandated a life sentence.77 In some mandatory sentencing 
regimes, the critical facts must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt,78 but in others the legislature contemplates judicial fact-finding 
using the preponderance of the evidence standard.79  
Although the latter procedures may be more efficient and reliable, they 
have also spawned important constitutional objections.80 These objections 
parallel the issues raised by the use of charging threats to induce guilty 
pleas. On the one hand, both practices curtail the availability to defendants 
of basic jury trial protections in the determination of the facts on which 
their punishment depends. On the other hand, judicial regulation of these 
practices would run counter to traditional doctrines of deference to 
coordinate branches of government. At issue in Bordenkircher was the 
tradition of judicial deference to prosecutorial charging decisions. In the 
sentencing context, the issue was judicial deference to the legislative 
determination of crime elements. 
The Court confronted these sentencing issues for the first time in 1986 
in McMillan v. Pennsylvania.81 Although Apprendi later repudiated much 
of McMillan, the earlier case remains a good starting point for this Part, 
both because it illuminates the significance of Apprendi and because it was 
decided by the same group of Justices that decided Goodwin and thereby 
sheds light on the relationship between the vindictiveness cases and the 
sentencing cases.82 After considering McMillan, I summarize the later 
Apprendi cases and describe how exactly they are formalist and how 
consequentialist. 
 
 
condemnation (in either a discretionary or presumptive system), the legislature might increase the 
applicable maximum sentence, in lieu of (or in addition to) increasing the minimum. Both sorts of 
increases will be referred to here as “sentence enhancements,” although their operation differs in at 
least one important respect: an increased maximum enhances the scope of the sentencer’s discretion, 
while an increased minimum diminishes discretion. 
 77.  Borderkircher, 434 U.S. at 359 n.2 (quoting KY. REV. STAT. § 431.190 (1973)). 
 78. Id. at 359. 
 79.  See, e.g., McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 81 (1986) (discussing Pennsylvania’s 
Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act). 
 80.  Id. at 83. 
 81. 477 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 82. Table 1 below identifies the Justices and their votes in Goodwin, McMillan, and Apprendi. 
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A. McMillan: Taking the Powell Approach Again 
In 1982, Pennsylvania adopted its Mandatory Minimum Sentencing 
Act, which provided that anyone who committed one of a list of serious 
felonies would be subject to a mandatory minimum prison sentence of five 
years if the sentencing judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that the person “‘visibly possessed a firearm’ during the commission of the 
offense.”83 Dynel McMillan and other defendants challenged the Act’s 
constitutionality, arguing that it violated the requirement that all elements 
of a crime be proven beyond a reasonable doubt,84 as mandated by In re 
Winship.85 These claims were ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court.86 
TABLE 1: BREAKDOWN OF VOTES IN GOODWIN, MCMILLAN, AND 
APPRENDI 
(Current sitting Justices are indicated in bold; M=majority; 
D=dissent; C=concurrence in judgment only; N/A=not on Court) 
 Goodwin McMillan Apprendi 
Stevens M D M 
Burger M M N/A 
O’Connor M M D 
Powell M M N/A 
Rehnquist M M D 
White M M N/A 
Blackmun C D N/A 
Brennan D D N/A 
Marshall D D N/A 
Ginsburg N/A N/A M 
Scalia N/A N/A M 
Souter N/A N/A M 
Thomas N/A N/A M 
Breyer N/A N/A D 
Kennedy N/A N/A D 
 
 
 
 83. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81. 
 84. Id. at 82–83. 
 85. 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[W]e explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the 
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which he is charged.”). 
 86. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 82. 
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Decided just four years after Goodwin by a Court comprised of the 
same nine justices, it should not be surprising that McMillan reflected a 
similar jurisprudential dynamic as the earlier case. Indeed, as indicated in 
Table 1, each of the five members of the McMillan majority was also part 
of the Goodwin majority, while both of the Goodwin dissenters also 
dissented in McMillan. Thus, only two justices “switched” in McMillan, 
and one of those, Blackmun, made just the small step from a concurrence 
in judgment to outright dissent. That leaves just one justice (Stevens) 
making a sharp break in alignment from Goodwin to McMillan. 
Fortunately, Stevens authored a lengthy dissent in the later case, which 
offers some clues as to why he “flipped.” 
First, however, consider Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion. Powell 
joined the opinion without comment, and it does indeed echo major 
themes from both his Bordenkircher dissent and the Goodwin majority 
opinion. Much as the earlier opinions emphasized judicial deference 
toward prosecutors, McMillan emphasized deference toward state 
legislatures.87 But just as the earlier opinions declined to make deference 
absolute, McMillan also indicated “there are constitutional limits to the 
State’s power in this regard . . . .”88 McMillan sought a middle ground—
just like Powell in Bordenkircher—between rejecting judicial review 
altogether and imposing rigid formal constraints that might unduly burden 
state crime-control efforts.  
The Court thus declined to articulate a “bright line” test,89 but, instead, 
identified several potentially relevant considerations. Most notably, the 
Court suggested the tail-wagging-the-dog test, asking whether the 
sentencing factor (here, visible possession of a firearm) really dominated 
the sentencing calculus.90 For instance, as to the Pennsylvania statute, 
because the predicate felonies all involved maximum sentences in excess 
of five years, the statute’s new five-year mandatory minimum did not 
amount to a tail wagging a dog: the Act “operates solely to limit the 
sentencing court’s discretion in selecting a penalty . . . already available to 
it without the special finding of visible possession of a firearm.”91 This 
 
 
 87. The Court put it this way: “[I]n determining what facts must be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt the state legislature’s definition of the elements of the offense is usually dispositive . . . . [W]e 
should not lightly construe the Constitution so as intrude upon the administration of justice by the 
individual States.” Id. at 85. 
 88. Id. at 86. 
 89. Id. at 91. 
 90. See id. at 88 (“The statute gives no impression of having been tailored to permit the visible 
possession finding to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.”). 
 91. Id. 
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McMillan test was reminiscent of Powell’s proposed test in 
Bordenkircher, which could be recast in similar terms: Was the state’s 
effort to induce a guilty plea (the tail) “wagging” the state’s legitimate 
interest in punishment (the dog)? 
With the majority opinion echoing the earlier Powell dissent, 
Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall reprised their dissenting position from 
Bordenkircher. Marshall, writing for the three, rejected the majority’s 
approach as overly deferential and basically endorsed the bright-line test 
proposed by Stevens.92 
Stevens, in his dissent, likewise rejected unlimited deference to the 
legislature. “It would demean the importance of the reasonable-doubt 
standard,” he wrote, “if the substance of the standard could be avoided by 
nothing more than a legislative declaration that prohibited conduct is not 
an ‘element’ of a crime.”93 Fair enough, but no one in McMillan was 
advocating absolute deference. The real question was the test to be used 
when a defendant asserted that a legislature had gone too far. Stevens 
proposed the following: “[I]f a State provides that a specific component of 
a prohibited transaction shall give rise to a special stigma and a special 
punishment, that component must be treated as a ‘fact necessary to 
constitute the crime’ within the meaning of our holding in Winship.”94 
And Stevens had little difficulty concluding that the Pennsylvania statute 
did, indeed, impose “special stigma” and “special punishment” based on 
the “specific component” of visible possession.95 
Stevens’s approach might be criticized as not merely insufficiently 
deferential to the state legislature, but also futile. The problem lay in his 
per se distinction between aggravating and mitigating facts: although 
aggravating facts would always have to be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, no such standard applied to the disproof of mitigating.96 The rule 
invited legislative evasion: a state that was intent on minimizing 
prosecutorial burdens might simply convert aggravating factors into 
mitigating. Stevens himself offered as an example “a statute making 
presence in any private or public place a felony punishable by up to five 
years imprisonment and yet allowing an affirmative defense for the 
defendant to prove, to a preponderance of the evidence, that he was not 
 
 
 92. Id. at 93–94 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall declined to join Stevens’s opinion because he 
was not ready to commit to Stevens’s approach to mitigating facts. Id at 94.  
 93. Id. at 102 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 94. Id. at 103 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 99. 
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robbing a bank.”97 This hypothetical echoed the prosecutorial evasion 
scenario that so troubled the Court in Bordenkircher and Goodwin (i.e., 
adopting an aggressive high-to-low charging strategy). 
Stevens dismissed the evasion possibilities in this context, however, as 
unlikely in a democratic system. “No democratically elected legislature 
would enact [the hypothetical] law, and if it did, a broad-based coalition of 
bankers and bank customers would soon see the legislation repealed.”98 
The aggravating/mitigating distinction was thus explained by reference to 
the view that “‘constitutional law appropriately exists for those situations 
where representative government cannot be trusted, not those where we 
know it can.’”99  
B. The Apprendi Canon: Stevens’s Triumph 
Beginning with Jones v. United States100 in 1999, a majority of the 
Court signaled first its doubts about, and then its rejection of, the approach 
taken in McMillan. Five cases constitute what we may think of as the 
“Apprendi canon”: Jones, Apprendi, Ring v. Arizona,101 Blakely v. 
Washington,102 and United States v. Booker.103 In these cases—all but one 
vigorously contested 5-4 decisions—the Court adopted and extended the 
rule proposed by Justice Stevens in his McMillan dissent. Indeed, Stevens 
himself authored the majority opinions in Apprendi and Booker. He was 
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas. 
Technically, Jones presented a question of statutory, not constitutional, 
interpretation. The federal carjacking statute at issue in the case provided a 
standard fifteen-year maximum sentence, but an enhanced twenty-five-
year maximum sentence if there had been “serious bodily injury.”104 The 
Court determined that this “serious bodily injury” prong of the statute 
should be regarded as an element of a separate, aggravated carjacking 
offense, thus triggering rights to jury fact-finding beyond a reasonable 
doubt rather than merely an additional factor for the judge to find at 
sentencing.105 The Court reached this interpretation, in part, because a 
 
 
 97. Id. at 100 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 98. Id. at 101 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 99. Id. at 101 n.5 (quoting JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 183 (1980)). 
 100. 526 U.S. 227 (1999). 
 101. 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
 102. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 103. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  
 104. Jones, 526 U.S. at 230. 
 105. Id. at 232. 
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contrary result would raise “grave and doubtful constitutional questions,” 
specifically, by increasing the defendant’s sentencing exposure on the 
basis of a fact not proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.106 As the 
dissenters recognized, the majority here embraced a more robust 
conception of jury-trial rights than had been apparent in the Court’s recent 
jurisprudence.107  
What was merely suggested as a constitutional question in Jones 
became a constitutional holding the following year in Apprendi. Charles 
C. Apprendi, Jr., pled guilty in New Jersey state court to three weapons 
violations.108 At sentencing, the judge determined that Apprendi had acted 
with a racially biased purpose, which, under the state hate crimes statute, 
increased the maximum possible sentence from twenty to thirty years.109 
In ruling that this process had violated Apprendi’s constitutional rights, the 
Court limited the McMillan wag-the-dog analysis to sentence 
enhancements at the bottom end of the sentencing range, i.e., fact-finding 
that triggers a mandatory minimum sentence.110 As to enhancements at the 
top end of the range, the Court adopted this bright-line rule: Other than the 
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.111 The Court thus held that New 
Jersey’s sentence enhancement procedure was “an unacceptable departure 
from the jury tradition that is an indispensable part of our criminal justice 
system.”112 
In Ring, the Court extended Apprendi to capital punishment, 
overturning a sentencing scheme in which a judge found the aggravating 
factors required to make a murder defendant eligible for death.113 The 
Court saw no good reason to distinguish Apprendi; if the jury-trial right 
encompassed the fact-finding necessary to increase a defendant’s 
sentencing exposure by ten years, then it must also encompass the fact-
finding necessary to impose the death penalty.114 
 
 
 106. Id. at 239 (citing United States v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)). 
 107. Id. at 272 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 108. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 469–70 (2000). 
 109. Id. at 470. 
 110. Id. at 487 n.13. 
 111. Id. at 490. 
 112. Id. at 497. 
 113. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002). 
 114. Id. at 609. 
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In Blakely, the Court considered Apprendi’s applicability to sentencing 
guidelines.115 Sentencing guidelines prescribe a narrow sentencing range, 
within a broader statutory range, based on the presence or absence of 
specified factors. For instance, when Ralph Howard Blakely, Jr., pled 
guilty in Washington state court to second-degree kidnapping, he faced a 
broad statutory range of zero to ten years.116 Pursuant to state sentencing 
guidelines, however, Blakely’s offense triggered a “standard range” of 
forty-nine to fifty-three months,117 with the possibility of an above-range 
sentence if the judge found “substantial and compelling reasons justifying 
an exceptional sentence.”118 The judge made such a finding on the basis of 
his determination that Blakely acted with “deliberate cruelty,” and 
imposed a sentence of ninety months119—well above the high end of the 
standard range, but still well below the ten-year statutory maximum. 
The Court nonetheless held that this process violated Apprendi, 
refining the Apprendi rule as follows: “When a judge inflicts punishment 
that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the 
facts ‘which the law makes essential to the punishment,’ and the judge 
exceeds his proper authority.”120 Thus, because the judge in Blakely had 
imposed a sentence that would not have been legally permissible absent 
his finding of deliberate cruelty, the judge had violated the defendant’s 
right to a jury trial.121 
In overturning Washington’s sentencing regime, Blakely also cast into 
doubt the mandatory guidelines systems employed in a number of other 
jurisdictions, including, perhaps most importantly, the federal sentencing 
guidelines. In United States v. Booker, the Court finally addressed the 
federal system, and held that it, too, ran afoul of the Apprendi rule to the 
extent that it relied on judicial fact-finding.122 Notably, however, the 
Apprendi Five fractured over the remedy for this constitutional violation. 
Four of the five would have retained the mandatory character of the 
federal guidelines but required jury fact-finding for sentence 
enhancements.123 Ginsburg switched sides, though, to create a separate 
majority in favor of a different remedy: conversion of the guidelines from 
 
 
 115. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004). 
 116. Id. at 299. 
 117. Id. at 300. 
 118. Id. at 299 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 119. Id. at 300. 
 120. Id. at 303–04 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 121. Id. at 305. 
 122. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005). 
 123. Id. at 272–73 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); id. at 313 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part). 
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mandatory to advisory.124 Booker thus boasted two majority opinions, the 
“merits opinion” (joined by all members of the Apprendi Five) and the 
“remedy opinion” (authored by Justice Breyer and joined by Ginsburg and 
the merits dissenters). 
The Booker remedy has not been the only occasion on which the Five 
have parted company. Of greatest significance, Scalia joined the Apprendi 
dissenters in Harris v. United States to exempt mandatory minimums from 
the Apprendi rule.125 Thus, a judge may still find the facts necessary to 
trigger a mandatory minimum (as long as the minimum does not exceed 
the otherwise applicable maximum). In effect, then, the Apprendi rule 
deals just with the defendant’s worst-case scenario: the rule is violated 
only if a judge’s fact-finding results in an increase in the maximum 
sentence that may be imposed. 
C. Apprendi’s Aims 
In order to appreciate the inconsistencies between Bordenkircher and 
the Apprendi cases, we should begin by considering what exactly the 
Apprendi Five said they were up to: what vision purports to animate the 
extraordinary doctrinal changes they have embraced? (To be sure, critics 
contend that the Five cannot really be serious about the vision they have 
articulated because there is a seemingly wide disconnect between that 
vision and the reality of the Apprendi rule they adopted. I will address this 
criticism in the next Section.) 
The Apprendi decisions represent a self-conscious choice in favor of 
the “common-law ideal” of jury trial over the “civil-law ideal of 
administrative perfection.”126 The decisions thus rejected a model of 
bureaucratized criminal justice, embodied by judicially administered 
sentencing guidelines, despite the model’s conceded advantages of 
efficiency and consistency.127 In lieu of these values, the Apprendi Five 
 
 
 124. Id. at 245. It remains arguable whether the formal switch to “advisory” guidelines has 
rendered the federal system materially more discretionary, as appellate courts, exercising 
“reasonableness review” over post-Booker sentences, have proven quite reluctant to approve some of 
the more adventuresome departures from guidelines norms. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 434 F.3d 
684 (4th Cir. 2006) (overturning sentence where district court took into account federal/state 
sentencing disparity in imposing sentence below guidelines range); United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 
625 (4th Cir. 2006) (overturning sentence where district court attempted to mitigate the disparate 
treatment of crack and powder cocaine in guidelines); United States v. Galicia-Cardenas, 443 F.3d 553 
(7th Cir. 2006) (overturning sentence where district court adjusted sentence so as to take into account 
lack of “fast-track” program in prosecuting United States Attorney’s Office). 
 125. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 551–52 (2002). 
 126. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313. 
 127. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 607 (2002) (“Entrusting to a judge the finding of facts 
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prioritized the following: (1) democratic control over the criminal justice 
system, (2) libertarian checks on state power, and (3) fairness to 
defendants.128 Let us consider each of these values in turn. 
1. Democratic Control 
The Apprendi cases linked the jury to democratic values: “Just as 
suffrage ensures the people’s ultimate control in the legislative and 
executive branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the 
judiciary.”129 At the same time, it might seem a bit odd for an (unelected) 
Supreme Court to strike down a host of legislatively adopted sentencing 
schemes in the name of democratic values. Why not permit a politically 
accountable legislature to employ the most efficient means (i.e., judicial 
fact-finding) to implement its choices about how much weight to give to 
particular sentencing factors?  
The Apprendi decisions suggest two responses. First, legislative 
decisions regarding sentencing factors are necessarily somewhat crude; a 
legislature cannot hope to design a sentencing system that takes into 
account all of the complexity of the real world. As a result, the literal 
application of any sentencing rule will inevitably produce some unduly 
harsh outcomes that are not truly consistent with public preferences. 
Moreover, this disconnect between global legislative judgments and case-
specific community preferences is likely exacerbated by the tendency, 
demonstrated in the social science literature, for people to make harsher 
judgments about crime in the abstract than when confronted with the facts 
 
 
necessary to support a death sentence might be ‘an admirably fair and efficient scheme of criminal 
justice designed for a society that is prepared to leave criminal justice to the State.’”) (citing Apprendi 
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring)); Booker, 543 U.S. at 244 
(acknowledging that jury fact-finding “may impair the most expedient and efficient sentencing of 
defendants”). 
 128. Jury fact-finding is also sometimes said to advance accuracy in adjudication. Paul H. 
Robinson & Barbara A. Spellman, Sentencing Decisions: Matching the Decisionmaker to the Decision 
Nature, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1124, 1145 (2005). I do not emphasize the point here because it does not 
play an important role in the Apprendi decisions. The accuracy hypothesis, moreover, has at best weak 
support in the empirical scholarship. Id. Professor Demleitner has suggested another value that may 
underlie the Apprendi cases: emphasizing a uniquely American institution, the jury, and thereby 
underscoring legal institutional differences with the rest of the world. Nora v. Demleitner, Where to 
Go From Here? The Roberts Court at the Crossroads of Sentencing, 18 FED. SENT’G REP. 221, 223 
(2006). 
 129. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306. By democratic control, of course, I do not mean majority-rule 
voting, as the term is sometimes understood, but, rather, decisionmaking by a representative body that 
is capable of bringing community values to bear in the decisionmaking process. Democratic values 
would thus favor processes designed to align government decisions with community preferences. 
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of a particular case.130 Preserving a role for the jury at sentencing thus 
offers a second level of democratic control that may mitigate the structural 
weaknesses of the first. Indeed, both Jones and Apprendi made note of the 
common-law tradition of “pious perjury,” whereby a jury might 
circumvent a harsh mandatory penalty that seemed disproportionate to the 
gravity of the offense.131 In a similar vein, a modern sentencing jury might 
decline to find an aggravating sentencing factor that was literally present 
in a case, but that would result in a sentence enhancement that, in the 
jury’s view, was unjust.132 
Second, a sentencing jury might also advance democratic values in 
cases in which the legislature has structured a sentencing factor in a 
manner that requires a discretionary exercise of judgment. Sentence 
enhancements are sometimes structured as bright-line rules; think, for 
instance, of the mandatory minimum in McMillan that was triggered by 
the visible possession of a firearm.133 But sometimes legislatures employ 
more open-ended standards; think here of the system overturned in 
Blakely, in which the sentence might be enhanced if the judge found 
“‘substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional 
sentence.’”134 An enhancement of this nature effectively delegates 
considerable discretionary authority to the sentencer. In such 
circumstances, where the legislature has left much undecided, we might 
find it particularly important that implementation of the standard include 
the participation of another actor with democratic legitimacy. And, as 
 
 
 130. Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Implementing Blakely, 17 FED. SENT’G REP. 106, 111 (2004). 
 131. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 479 n.5; Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 245 (1999).  
 132. As discussed in the next Section, a sentencing judge might also function as a check on a 
prosecutor’s overly aggressive use (relative to public preferences) of sentence enhancements. It is at 
least plausible, however, that a judge, schooled in rule-of-law norms and subject to appellate review, 
would be less likely than a jury to function as a check in the circumstances contemplated here, i.e., de 
facto nullification of the enhancement. This view resonates with Ring’s characterization of the original 
intent of the jury-trial right: “If the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the 
more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it.” Ring, 536 
U.S. at 609 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155–56 (1968)). Moreover, there are reasons to 
view judicial nullification as more problematic than jury nullification from the standpoint of 
democratic legitimacy. To be sure, in some jurisdictions (though not all), judges are elected and thus 
also have a measure of democratic legitimacy. At the same time, one can readily discern a number of 
reasons why the democratic credentials of even an elected judge might be viewed as unsatisfactory. 
For example, judges are drawn from only a very small subset of the community’s population (i.e., 
those with law degrees), elected judges are often intentionally shielded from the same level of 
democratic accountability as elected legislators (e.g., through longer terms in office, retention votes, 
and other special nonpartisan election processes), and, in the great run of routine cases, judges operate 
without any meaningful public scrutiny. 
 133.  McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 81 n.1 (1986) (quoting 42 PA. CONST. STAT. § 9712 
(1982)). 
 134.  Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.120(2) (2000)). 
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Jones pointed out, the common-law tradition is that the jury is not merely 
a finder of facts, but also an applier of law to facts.135 Thus, the Apprendi 
decisions do not necessarily contemplate that the jury’s role in sentencing 
will be limited to fact-finding, in the narrowest sense of the term, but may 
also extend to determining the applicability of more subjectively defined 
sentence enhancements.136 On this view, Apprendi advances democratic 
values by channeling the discretionary authority that is subtly embedded in 
mandatory sentencing regimes away from judges and toward juries. 
Note the complementary nature of these two considerations. The more 
particularized and rule-like the sentencing regime, the greater the need will 
be for an equitable mechanism, like the jury’s “pious perjury,” in order to 
address unanticipated instances of undue severity. As the sentencing 
regime grows more flexible and standard-like, the need for this form of 
law-correction will diminish, but, with an increase in the sentencer’s 
discretionary authority, concerns may grow as to the sentencer’s 
democratic legitimacy. Either way, the jury may have a useful role to play 
alongside the legislature in helping to ensure that sentencing outcomes 
conform to public preferences.137 
 
 
 135. Jones, 526 U.S. at 247. 
 136. See Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Blakely, 17 FED. SENT’G REP. 89, 92 (2004) 
(discussing uncertainty as to whether determinations involving “value judgments,” not just findings of 
historical fact, trigger jury trial right under Blakely). For an argument that juries are better suited than 
judges to determine blameworthiness for sentencing purposes, see Robinson & Spellman, supra note 
128, at 1146–47. 
 137. In addition to the reasons suggested by the Apprendi decisions, there is at least one other 
reason to regard the sentencing jury as an institution that might further democratic values: the jury 
brings to bear local views, as against the preferences of a distant legislature that may represent a host 
of communities with quite different views. The federal system offers particularly dramatic illustrations 
of the potential disconnects between the criminal justice preferences of a local community and a more 
encompassing polity. See, e.g., Michael M. O’Hear, National Uniformity/Local Uniformity: 
Reconsidering the Use of Departures to Reduce Federal/State Sentencing Disparities, 87 IOWA L. 
REV. 721, 731 (2002) (“Perhaps most striking are the federal death penalty cases in states that do not 
authorize capital punishment.”). But the same issue can also arise at the state level. See, e.g., Michael 
M. O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 VAND. L. REV. 783, 860–61 (2004) (discussing wide 
variations in county-level support for California’s Proposition 36, which requires diversion of drug 
offenders from incarceration to treatment). For an argument that local preferences should generally 
prevail, at least with respect to crime that occurs on a local scale, see Michael M. O’Hear, Localization 
and Transparency in Sentencing: Reflections on the New Early Disposition Departure, 27 HAMLINE L. 
REV. 358, 360–63 (2004). More controversially, localization through the jury may also provide a 
vehicle for predominantly African-American communities to address racial disparities in the operation 
of the criminal justice system. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the 
Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 679 (1995). For a leading critique of Professor Butler’s 
proposal, see Andrew D. Leipold, The Dangers of Race-Based Jury Nullification: A Response to 
Professor Butler, 44 UCLA L. REV. 109 (1996). 
 Even if one does not accept the view that juries are an effective medium for expressing public 
preferences, providing a more robust role for the jury may nonetheless serve the parallel end of 
enhancing public perception of democratic control. Robinson & Spellman, supra note 128, at 1148. In 
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2. Containing State Power 
The Apprendi decisions repeatedly claimed to protect individual liberty 
and contain state power.138 How so? One possibility, of course, is that 
democratic control works to restrict state power. That would imply, in the 
present context, a tendency for juries to sentence more leniently than 
judges, thereby diminishing the coercive power of the state. Ring, for 
instance, suggested that defendants might prefer sentencing juries to “less 
sympathetic” judges.139 This is doubtlessly true in some cases, but 
democratic control does not guarantee generous outcomes. Indeed, some 
empirical studies suggest that jury sentencing is often harsher than judicial 
sentencing.140 Thus, enhanced democratic control, in and of itself, would 
not seem the most effective way to limit state power.141 
But jury sentencing may serve to contain state power in another 
respect: as a sort of procedural tax on prosecutions, that is, a burden on 
limited state law enforcement resources that might diminish the number 
and intensity of prosecutions and give defendants greater leverage in plea 
negotiations. Jury sentencing might be implemented in one of two ways, 
either as a proceeding that is distinct from and subsequent to the 
determination of guilt, or as a connected adjunct to the basic criminal trial. 
If implemented through the former mechanism, the procedural costs 
 
 
other circumstances, the Court has recognized the importance of such perceptions. See, e.g., Nixon v. 
Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000) (“[W]e spoke in Buckley of the perception of 
corruption inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions, as a source of concern 
almost equal to quid pro quo improbity.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 138. See, e.g., Jones, 526 U.S. at 246 (referring to the jury as “the grand bulwark” of liberty); 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (characterizing purpose of right to jury trial as 
“guard[ing] against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers”); id. at 498 (“The founders 
of the American republic were not prepared to leave [criminal justice] to the State, which is why the 
jury-trial guarantee was one of the least controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights.”). This emphasis 
reflects broader trends in the Court’s criminal justice jurisprudence since about 2000. See Louis D. 
Bilionis, Criminal Justice After the Conservative Reformation, 94 GEO. L.J. 1347, 1352 (2006) 
(arguing that, in light of easing of social, cultural, and legal pressures for law-and-order 
jurispreudence, “we see a shift toward more liberty-affirming decisions . . . in the Supreme Court’s 
criminal justice work”). 
 139. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 
155–56 (1968)). 
 140. See, e.g., Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three-
State Study, 57 VAND. L. REV. 883, 898 (2004) (discussing jury sentencing in Kentucky). 
 141. The goal of limiting state power is easier to square with a jury sentencing right to the extent 
that defendants can unilaterally choose the finder of fact, selecting judge or jury according to which is 
expected to be more sympathetic. Some jurisdictions, however, require jury-trial waivers from both 
defendant and prosecutor. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34–36 (1965) (upholding 
constitutionality of federal rule to this effect). 
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(relative to judicial sentencing) are obvious: a jury must be assembled,142 
managed, instructed, and argued to, all with the enhanced formality that is 
attendant to jury, as opposed to bench, trials.143 If jury sentencing is 
simply folded into the trial on the merits, the whole process will be far 
more efficient, but this may not be appealing or practically feasible in a 
complex sentencing guidelines system, where sentencing may require fact-
finding on a dozen or more discrete factors beyond the elements of the 
offense.144 Moreover, even if this latter approach is selected, there is still 
the problem of guilty plea cases, in which the Apprendi decisions may 
necessitate the impaneling of a sentencing jury where no jury would 
otherwise be required.145 
The procedural tax theory squares with how the Apprendi decisions 
described what they were doing. There can be no question but that the 
decisions self-consciously rejected efficiency in favor of limited state 
power. As Ring put it, “[The jury-trial guarantee] has never been efficient; 
but it has always been free.”146 The procedural tax theory would go just 
one step further: because the jury trial has never been efficient, it has 
always been free. 
The procedural tax theory also squares with the Court’s pairing of the 
jury-trial right with the right to fact-finding beyond a reasonable doubt, 
which also protects individual liberty by imposing increased procedural 
burdens on prosecutors. The rule in Apprendi, for instance, expressly 
linked the two rights: “[A]ny fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
 
 
 142. In cases in which the defendant was convicted by a jury, the same jury might be reconvened 
for sentencing which would save the not inconsiderable costs associated with jury selection. Most 
cases, however, are resolved by guilty plea; in such cases, jury sentencing might necessitate the 
selection of a jury that otherwise would not have been required.  
 143. See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 390 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (detailing 
reasons jury trial entails “far more prosecutorial work” than bench trial); Turner, supra note 130, at 
109 (discussing procedural formalities that might have to be observed in sentencing proceedings under 
Blakely). These costs may vary by jurisdiction depending on how complex the jurisdiction’s 
sentencing scheme is and how the jury-trial rights are implemented. See id. at 110 (noting relatively 
low costs of implementing Apprendi in Kansas). 
 144. See Iontcheva Turner, supra note 130, at 108 (“[I]n many cases, bifurcation is indispensable 
to ensuring a fair trial.” When “Blakely-izing” its sentencing guidelines, Kansas “let judges determine 
on a case-by-case basis when bifurcation would be in the interest of justice.”).  
 145. To be sure, a plea agreement might include a waiver of jury rights as to sentencing; however, 
not all guilty pleas are rendered pursuant to an agreement, and (depending on the priorities and relative 
bargaining leverage of the parties) not all agreements need necessarily include a waiver of such rights. 
But see id. at 110 (noting “double-waiver” requirement in some jurisdictions, which requires that 
sentencing jury right be waived if trial jury right is waived). 
 146. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 607 (2002). 
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beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, 
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”147 
3. Fairness to Defendants 
Finally, the Apprendi decisions also purport to enhance fairness to 
defendants. Fairness, here, is used in the sense suggested by some 
behavioral law and economics scholars: consistency of outcomes with 
even imperfectly rational expectations.148 Fairness to defendants would 
thus imply that there are no nasty surprises at the end of the sentencing 
process; to the extent that the system fosters sentencing expectations, the 
system should not disappoint those expectations. Blakely, in particular, 
emphasized these considerations: 
Any evaluation of Apprendi’s “fairness” to criminal defendants 
must compare it with the regime it replaced, in which a defendant, 
with no warning in either his indictment or plea, would routinely 
see his maximum potential sentence balloon from as little as five 
years to as much as life imprisonment, based not on facts proved to 
his peers beyond a reasonable doubt, but on facts extracted after 
trial from a report compiled by a probation officer who the judge 
thinks more likely got it right than wrong.149 
The Apprendi decisions are thus presented as an effort to save 
defendants from nasty surprises delivered “without warning” at 
sentencing. 
D. Is It Really Just “Doctrinaire Formalism”? 
The Apprendi Five may claim that they are advancing democratic, 
libertarian, and fairness values, but are they really? Justice O’Connor, 
characterizing their handiwork as “doctrinaire formalism,” thinks 
otherwise.150 Her contention, along with that of the other Apprendi 
dissenters, is that the Apprendi rule will be evaded, such that there will be 
no step forward as to the basic jury-trial values, but, if anything, a step 
back. The dissenters have focused on three potential forms of evasion: (1) 
legislative inversion of sentence enhancements (i.e., increasing standard 
 
 
 147. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 148. See infra Part II.D.2. 
 149. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 311–12 (2004) (internal citations omitted). 
 150. Id. at 321 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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sentences and converting aggravating factors into mitigating), (2) a return 
to discretionary sentencing, and (3) prosecutorial use of plea inducements 
to force defendants to surrender their jury rights at sentencing. (A fourth 
type of evasion, expanded use of mandatory minimums, is discussed 
separately in the Conclusion.151) These evasion arguments, which mirror 
analogous concerns raised by the Bordenkircher and Goodwin majorities, 
are discussed in turn below. I will show that there are plausible responses 
to each of these concerns, and that, accordingly, the Apprendi decisions 
cannot fairly be accused of indifference to consequences. Before reaching 
the evasion arguments, however, this Section begins with two prefatory 
considerations: a description of the real formalism of the Apprendi 
decisions and a summary of key principles of BLE that will aid our 
understanding of Apprendi’s consequentialism. 
1. Apprendi’s Formalism 
There is at least one sense in which the Apprendi decisions are 
unabashedly formalist: rule structure. Recall that the McMillan test, which 
was largely displaced by Apprendi and its progeny, employed a highly 
indeterminate standard, i.e., whether the tail (the sentencing factor) was 
wagging the dog (the underlying offense).152 Blakely, in particular, heaped 
scorn on the test for its indeterminacy.153 The Apprendi bright-line rule 
was preferable for the more robust protection it provided for jury rights; it 
would be perverse, Blakely suggested, to adopt a discretionary test that 
effectively endowed judges with the authority to decide the scope of their 
own power relative to juries.154 
Adopting a formalist test, however, is not the same thing as 
“doctrinaire formalism,” which implies indifference to consequences. 
Indeed, as Blakely suggested, one might adopt a bright-line rule 
specifically in order to produce more meaningful consequences.155 
 
 
 151. This form of evasion stands on a different footing than the other three because the Apprendi 
Five have no unified position on it; four would have closed the “loophole” in Harris, while Justice 
Scalia (without explanation) provided the key fifth vote to keep it open. See supra Part II.B. Thus, 
discussion of this form of evasion would not contribute much to the immediate objective of teasing out 
the shared values and assumptions of the Five. 
 152.  McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986). 
 153. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 312 n.13. 
 154. Id. at 308 (“Whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates this manipulable [McMillan] 
standard rather than Apprendi’s bright-line rule depends on the plausibility of the claim that the 
Framers would have left definition of the scope of jury power up to judges’ intuitive sense of how far 
[in the legislative creation of new sentencing factors] is too far. We think that claim not plausible at all 
. . . .”). 
 155. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 308 (rejecting indeterminate standard as unlikely to prevent erosion 
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Underscoring this point, the Apprendi decisions repeatedly rejected 
arguments that the constitutional analysis should turn on statutory 
labels.156 As O’Connor herself recognized, these rejected tests were no 
less “bright-line” than the Apprendi rule.157 What drew the Apprendi Five 
to their rule was not merely its formalist character, but also its anticipated 
consequences.158 
2. Key Principles of Behavioral Law and Economics 
A central insight of BLE is that “people evaluate outcomes based on 
the change they represent from an initial reference point, rather than based 
on the nature of the outcome itself . . . .”159 This basic insight informs four 
salient, overlapping principles, each of which has been demonstrated in a 
host of empirical studies. First, people tend to be loss-averse; “they weigh 
losses more heavily than they do gains of equal magnitude.”160 Second, 
although loss-avoidance may be preferred to gains, the concepts of “gain” 
and “loss” are malleable.161 Thus, the framing of a transaction as a gain or 
a loss may play an important role in determining whether or not it is 
viewed as desirable. Third, the starting point in a transaction tends to 
condition the outcome, even if the starting point is random or irrelevant.162 
An initial reference effectively becomes an anchor, and “people usually do 
not adjust away from their anchors enough.”163 Thus, for instance, one 
study shows that “the asking price of a house strongly influences 
 
 
of jury’s power). 
 156. See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 604 (2002) (“If Arizona prevailed on its . . . 
argument, Apprendi would be reduced to a meaningless and formalistic rule of statutory drafting.”); 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000) (“The relevant inquiry is not one of form, but of 
effect . . . .”). 
 157. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 321 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 158. To be sure, the Apprendi decisions might be defended on the basis of other formalist values. 
See King & Klein, supra note 17, at 1485 (arguing that Apprendi “maintains fidelity to historical 
practice and prior decisions”). But see Bibas, supra note 17, at 196 (arguing that relevant history is 
unclear). The point here is not that the Apprendi decisions would have come out differently if the Five 
had been oblivious to consequences, but, rather, that the decisions do plausibly purport to attend to 
consequences. Indeed, despite frequent citations in the decisions to historical sources, I think Professor 
Bibas has it right when he argues that originalism was not the “driving force” behind the decisions. Id. 
at 201. 
 159. Jolls, et al., supra note 19, at 1535. 
 160. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 
2508 (2004). 
 161. Id. at 2512; Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspective on Pain 
and Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341 (1995). 
 162. Bibas, supra note 160, at 2515; MAX H. BAZERMAN & MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTIATING 
RATIONALLY 29 (1992). 
 163. Bibas, supra note 160, at 2516. 
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appraisals of its value, even for experts who consider the asking price 
completely uninformative and who have plenty of other information.”164 
Fourth, the losses that people try to avoid include not only material 
losses, but also losses to reputation and self-image.165 As a result of these 
considerations, human behavior often conforms to the principle of 
reciprocal fairness: people are willing to sacrifice their own material well-
being to help those who are acting fairly, but are also willing to sacrifice 
so as to punish those who are acting unfairly.166 (Fairness, as suggested 
above, can be understood by reference to deviations from expectations; for 
instance, consumers will perceive as unfair a firm that takes advantage of 
the short-term scarcity of a good by increasing established prices.167) 
People, in other words, like to have a reputation for, and a self-image of, 
decency; but they also seek to avoid the appearance of being a dupe or a 
doormat.168 
3. The Evasion Arguments 
Having now identified some of the ways in which actual human 
behavior might differ from the model of homo economicus, let us consider 
how these principles might inform the debate over Apprendi’s 
consequentialism. This debate largely revolves around three potential 
strategies for evading Apprendi. 
a. Legislative Inversion 
As Justice O’Connor observed, the Apprendi rule could, in principle, 
be defeated by a seemingly straightforward legislative reform: standard 
penalties could be increased, with maximum sentences then reduced based 
on the absence of specified aggravating circumstances.169 In this inversion 
process, sentence “aggravators” would effectively be converted into 
“mitigators.” However, at least in principle, the same sentencing outcomes 
should be obtained without a need ever to impanel a sentencing jury. 
(Recall that the Apprendi rule only requires a jury when the maximum 
 
 
 164. Id. (citing Gregory B. Northcraft & Margaret A. Neale, Experts, Amateurs, and Real Estate: 
An Anchoring-and-Adjustment Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions, 39 ORGANIZATIONAL 
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 84, 94–95 (1987)). 
 165. Jolls et al., supra note 19, at 1494. 
 166. Id. (citing Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness Into Game Theory and Economics, 83 
AM. ECON. REV. 1281 (1993)). 
 167. Id. at 1511–12. 
 168. Id. at 1495. 
 169. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 541–42 (2002) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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sentence is increased beyond the standard range for the offense.) If 
legislatures were, in fact, to respond to Apprendi by systematically 
inverting their sentencing regimes, then O’Connor’s charge of doctrinaire 
formalism might have some appeal: the inverted regimes, still relying on 
judicial fact-finding, would do nothing to advance Apprendi’s purported 
objectives of democratic control and limited state power.170 
In Apprendi, however, Justice Stevens repeated the response he made 
to this argument in McMillan, characterizing the likelihood of inversion as 
“remote.”171 He relied on “democratic constraints” that would “discourage 
legislatures from enacting penal statutes that exposed every defendant 
convicted of, for example, weapons possession, to a maximum sentence 
exceeding that which is, in the legislature’s judgment, generally 
proportional to the crime.”172 Stevens, in other words, doubted that 
politically sensitive legislators operating in the real world would actually 
do as the dissenters predicted.173 
Why should this be so? Why would voters find any more objectionable 
a high-to-low than a low-to-high sentencing scheme? To use the facts of 
Apprendi itself as an example, why would voters support a ten-year 
maximum for a simple firearms possession offense with a possible 
additional ten years if there were racial bias, but oppose a standard twenty-
year maximum for the firearms offense with a reduction to ten years in the 
absence of racial bias? In principle, the consequences of both laws should 
be the same.174 Yet, there is something intuitively plausible in Stevens’s 
claim that voters will perceive the two laws quite differently, and, indeed, 
precisely as Stevens predicted, legislatures have not rushed to adopt top-
down schemes in the wake of Apprendi.175  
Although not fully articulated, Stevens’s intuition must rest on 
assumptions of cognitive bias.176 In order to see why, we first need to 
 
 
 170. On the other hand, inversion might advance the third objective, fairness to defendants, 
inasmuch as an increase in the standard maximum sentence might diminish the likelihood of 
defendants receiving a nasty surprise at sentencing. 
 171. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 466 n.16. 
 172. Id. 
 173. In case this were not enough, the Apprendi Court also reserved some “wiggle room” for itself 
to deal with inversion through constitutional adjudication. Chanenson, supra note 74, at 415. 
 174. On the margins, a few cases might come out differently based on the different allocation of 
the burden of proof. It seems unlikely, however, that a technical legal difference of this nature would 
engender the sort of dramatically different voter response that Stevens contemplated. 
 175. The states most affected by the Apprendi line of cases have instead either engrafted jury fact-
finding onto their presumptive sentencing regimes, converted from presumptive to discretionary, or 
ignored the problem. See Stemen & Wilhelm, supra note 76, at 8–9. 
 176. The “democratic constraints” argument has been subject to much criticism on the ground 
that, among other things, it rests on the implausible assumption that voters understand statutory 
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consider what it is that legislators want from sentencing law. In his 
influential work on the politics of criminal law, Professor Stuntz has 
identified two key objectives: (1) ensuring conviction and punishment of 
people “who commit the kinds of offenses that voters fear,”177 and (2) 
taking symbolic stands against the latest crime dominating the headlines 
(the proverbial “offense du jour”).178 Legislators, however, do not want 
indiscriminate across-the-board sentence increases. For one thing, they 
must recognize that voters do not necessarily support severe sentences for 
low-level criminals.179 For another, sentence increases cost money, and 
legislators (at the state level at least) must be mindful of fiscal 
pressures.180 Indeed, if expenditures on incarcerating low-level criminals 
are too high, legislators may compromise their own future capacity to 
respond to new offenses du jour. 
It is the undesirability of indiscriminate sentence increases that makes 
inversion so politically unattractive. To be sure, in a world of rational 
actors, it would be easy to invert without causing a broad increase in 
sentence lengths. But two forms of cognitive bias, framing and anchoring, 
complicate matters. First, because aggravators are framed as losses for 
convicted defendants at sentencing, while mitigators are framed as 
benefits, legislators will find it unappealing to enact a new sentencing 
scheme that is rich in mitigators but poor in aggravators; doing so is likely 
to appear to the public as “soft on crime.” (What politician would tout her 
vote for reducing the sentences of criminals who do not happen to be 
racists?) Yet, without the simultaneous conversion of aggravators to 
 
 
maxima but not sentence enhancements. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and 
Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1137 (2001). I offer here an 
original defense to Stevens’s hypothesis that does not rest on the assumption that voters have a 
patchwork knowledge of how sentencing works, but, rather, on the assumption that voters and 
legislators evaluate what they “know” in ways that are shaped by framing and anchoring effects. 
 177.  William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 530 
(2001). 
 178. Id. at 531–32. 
 179. See Vincent Schiraldi & Judith Greene, Reducing Correctional Costs in an Era of Tightening 
Budgets and Shifting Public Opinion, 14 FED. SENT’G REP. 332, 332–33 (2002) (summarizing 
evidence of recent softening in public attitudes towards sentencing and growing interest in 
rehabilitative alternatives for nonviolent criminals). In light of recent public corruption prosecutions, 
there may also be a measure of self-interest on the part of legislators in avoiding indiscriminate 
sentence increases. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the 
“American Criminal Class”: Why Congress (Sometimes) Protects the Rights of Defendants, 2004 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 599, 603–04 (2004). 
 180. See Ronald F. Wright, The Power of Bureaucracy in the Response to Blakely and Booker, 43 
HOUS. L. REV. 389, 412–13 (2006) (arguing, based on record of state responses to Blakely and Booker, 
that state sentencing commissions can successfully influence legislative reforms with appeals to fiscal 
responsibility). 
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mitigators, a broad increase in standard sentence ranges is likely to result 
in increased actual sentence lengths.  
Second, research on anchoring effects teaches that starting points can 
condition outcomes, even if the starting points are irrelevant or arbitrary. 
This suggests that, in practice, simple inversion of a sentencing system 
(even assuming full conversion of aggravators to mitigators) will not 
produce the same outcomes that were achieved pre-inversion. Instead, the 
newly increased standard sentence that is triggered by a conviction, even 
though technically irrelevant to defendants who qualify for mitigated 
sentences, will likely push sentences up across the board. This provides 
further support for Stevens’s intuition that legislatures will avoid the 
inversion option. 
b. Discretionary Sentencing 
If inversion is politically unappealing, a legislature might instead evade 
Apprendi by adopting a discretionary sentencing system. Nothing in the 
Apprendi line of decisions casts doubt on the constitutionality of judicial 
fact-finding in connection with the selection of a sentence within a broad 
range. Indeed, Booker itself makes clear that a discretionary system 
employing advisory guidelines with judicial fact-finding is perfectly 
constitutional.181 Such a switch would plainly undermine the goal of 
democratic control, as well as lift the procedural tax on the exercise of 
state prosecutorial power. 
Responding to this argument, Blakely suggested that the switch to 
discretion, like inversion, might prove to be more a theoretical than an 
actual concern, noting that Kansas, the first state to modify its sentencing 
system as a result of Apprendi, had opted for jury fact-finding in lieu of 
judicial discretion.182 Still, the possibility that some states might abandon 
presumptive sentencing schemes was not dismissed out of hand as 
inversion had been. And the fact that the Booker majority subsequently 
adopted this very approach for the federal system suggests that such 
dismissal would have been mistaken. 
But the possibility of greater reliance on discretionary sentencing does 
not really undermine Apprendi’s aims as much as might first appear. First, 
as demonstrated by the example of Kansas and other states, many 
presumptive jurisdictions will choose to remain presumptive (with the 
 
 
 181. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005) (“We have never doubted the authority of 
a judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory range.”). 
 182. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 390–410 (2004). 
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addition, of course, of jury fact-finding).183 This is understandable, given 
both long-term national trends against discretionary sentencing and the 
fiscal control advantages of sentencing guidelines.184 Even if democratic 
control is not uniformly advanced across the country, it will be in at least 
some jurisdictions. 
Second, although a switch to discretion may lift the procedure tax, a 
system reformed along these lines may nonetheless offer greater 
constraints on state power than a mandatory system. In a discretionary 
system, the judge may serve as a meaningful check on prosecutorial 
overreaching,185 while in a mandatory system the judge may be reduced to 
a much less significant “bean-counting” role.186 Prosecutors can dominate 
a mandatory system by controlling which sentence enhancements are 
sought and which grounds for leniency are supported or contested.187 
Although prosecutors certainly do not always use their power to obtain the 
longest possible sentence, there are good reasons to believe that 
prosecutors, by and large, tend to take a more favorable view of their own 
cases than do judges.188 And indeed, federal judges, with their newly 
 
 
 183. In addition to Kansas, at least six more states have recently adopted jury fact-finding for 
sentencing purposes in the wake of the Apprendi decisions. Stemen & Wilhelm, supra note 76, at 8. At 
least two states have switched from mandatory to discretionary, while several others with mandatory 
systems that seem to violate Blakely have yet to respond. Id. at 8–9. 
 184. See Dale G. Parent & Richard S. Frase, Why Minnesota Will Weather Blakely’s Blast, 18 
FED. SENT’G REP. 12, 17 (2005) (discussing motivation of Minnesota to retain its presumptive 
system). 
 185. See Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 
1471, 1474 (1993) (“Historically, the prosecutor’s extraordinary bargaining power over defendants 
was constrained by independent judicial sentencing.”). 
 186. See id. at 1475 (“Judicial sentencing no longer limits prosecutorial power in federal courts.”); 
Kate Stith & José A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 
1247, 1255 (1997) (“One judge has recently likened his role in sentencing to that of a ‘notary public’ 
. . . .”).  
 187. O’Hear, supra note 18, at 808. 
 188. See Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive 
Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1590–91 (2006) (describing how cognitive bias helps to 
explain “the failure of prosecutors always to make just decisions”). There are limits to this line of 
reasoning; as Professor Stuntz observes, “[m]ost of the judges are elected by the same voters who elect 
district attorneys.” William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2561 (2002). Many judges, moreover, are former prosecutors or are otherwise 
philosophically inclined to give prosecutors the benefit of the doubt. At the same time, it is important 
to recognize that democratic accountability is often structured quite differently—and less robustly—
for judges than for prosecutors, see supra note 124, and judges are largely protected from the sorts of 
case-specific cognitive bias described by Professor Burke. Judges’ separation from the institutional 
culture of law enforcement may also enhance their ability to take an appropriately skeptical view of 
some prosecutions. See GARY T. LOWENTHAL, DOWN AND DIRTY JUSTICE: A CHILLING JOURNEY 
INTO THE DARK WORLD OF CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL COURTS 111 (2003) (describing anti-defendant 
culture within which prosecutors work). 
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enhanced discretion, have been imposing a higher rate of sentences below 
guidelines-mandated levels than they did pre-Booker.189 
Finally, Blakely argued for the fairness of a discretionary system 
relative to a mandatory one.190 Fairness, as BLE scholars suggest, should 
take into account baseline expectations, and a discretionary sentencing 
system will satisfy expectations insofar as it reliably results in a sentence 
within the maximum established by the conviction. As Justice Scalia put 
it, “I think it not unfair to tell a prospective felon that if he commits his 
contemplated crime he is exposing himself to a jail sentence of 30 years—
and that if, upon conviction, he gets anything less than that he may thank 
the mercy of a tenderhearted judge . . . .”191 By contrast, the problem with 
a mandatory system is that it might, “with no warning,” result in a 
dramatically higher sentence than expected on the basis of the offense of 
conviction.192 
In sum, while I do not mean to argue that discretionary sentencing is 
necessarily better than mandatory, there are at least plausible reasons, 
taking into account libertarian and fairness values, to prefer a discretionary 
system over a mandatory system that uses judicial fact-finding.193 
 
 
 189. Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker: Advisory Guidelines in the Federal System, 43 
HOUS. L. REV. 341, 350 (2006). For a more detailed argument in favor of judicial discretion at 
sentencing as a means of protecting individual liberty, see Luna, supra note 16, at 95–100. 
 190. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 311–12 (2004). See supra text accompanying note 
149. 
 191. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 192. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 311–12. The argument here is colorable, but admittedly not compelling 
on its face, for it assumes that defendant expectations in a discretionary system will be shaped by the 
maximum possible sentence. It is possible, however, that in some cases the “anchor” will be a much 
smaller number, for instance, the sentencing prediction of the defendant’s lawyer, the recommendation 
made by the prosecutor, or a sentence recently imposed in a similar case. Indeed, this is almost certain 
to be the case in a discretionary system with robust advisory guidelines, such as the post-Booker 
federal system. If the anchor is low, then a defendant’s expectations may be as severely disappointed 
as in a mandatory system. Cf. United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(holding that judge need not give advance notice to defendant of intent to impose sentence above the 
federal guidelines’ advisory range). Moreover, given general tendencies toward overoptimism 
observed by BLE, there is good reason to think that defendants will focus more on potential low 
anchors than high. Bibas, supra note 160, at 2498. Thus, if a mandatory system operates in a 
transparent and predictable fashion, it may do an even better job of fulfilling expectations than a 
discretionary system. A definitive resolution of the fairness question, then, depends on a number of 
uncertain empirical issues. 
 193. Professor Huigens also defends discretionary systems as better able to achieve “fine-
grainedness” in sentencing, which is “important for maintaining the moral credibility and public 
standing of the criminal justice system.” Kyron Huigens, Solving the Williams Puzzle, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1048, 1069 (2005). Professor Markel, however, argues forcefully that at least some forms of 
discretionary sentencing may violate constitutional norms of nonarbitrariness in punishment. Dan 
Markel, Luck or Law: The Constitutional Argument Against Indeterminate Sentencing Schemes II 
(2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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c. Plea Bargaining 
Given the option of discretionary sentencing, legislatures might or 
might not choose to give juries a more robust role to play in the sentencing 
process. To whatever extent juries were formally made available, however, 
the Apprendi dissenters predicted that they would be seldom used:  
[T]he greater expense attached to trials and their greater complexity, 
taken together in the context of an overworked criminal justice 
system, will likely mean, other things being equal, fewer trials and a 
greater reliance upon plea-bargaining—a system in which 
punishment is set not by judges or juries but by advocates acting 
under bargaining constraints.194  
Moreover, not only would Apprendi produce fewer trials, but, the 
dissenters argued, the resulting system would be less fair, in the sense that 
it would be less uniform. Prosecutors would control the punishment by 
deciding which sentencing factors to charge and then bargain away.195 
These prosecutorial processes, however, “lack transparency and too often 
mean nonuniform, sometimes arbitrary, sentencing practices . . . .”196 
Since at least the time of Bordenkircher, increasing numbers of 
defendants have been surrendering their right to a jury trial on the basic 
issue of guilt or innocence,197 and there is no reason to doubt the 
assumption of the Apprendi dissenters that the right to a jury trial on 
sentencing factors will be treated any differently. This does not necessarily 
mean, however, that Apprendi is a futile gesture. Again, consider 
Apprendi’s three aims in turn. 
First, although most defendants might trade away their Apprendi rights, 
that does not necessarily mean that all will. Moreover, those defendants 
most likely to insist on a jury trial will include those who most stubbornly 
believe that the application of a particular sentence enhancement sought by 
a prosecutor would be unjust. It is precisely in this sort of case, in which 
there are legitimate disputes surrounding the application of a sentencing 
factor, that a jury might have the most to contribute as the voice of the 
community. It is the hard cases in which democratic control is most 
important in the implementation of sentencing enhancements, and 
 
 
 194. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 338 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 195. See id. 
 196. Id. at 345. 
 197. See Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal 
Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 91 (2005) (showing long-term guilty plea trends in federal cases). 
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Apprendi does at least ensure the availability of a jury in those cases. As 
Blakely observed, “[t]hat more defendants elect to waive that right [to a 
jury] (because, for example, government at the moment is not particularly 
oppressive) does not prove that a constitutional provision guaranteeing 
availability of that option is disserved.”198 The flipside is that when 
government does act oppressively, as by seeking morally or legally 
dubious sentencing enhancements, the defendant may seek protection from 
his or her peers on the jury. 
Second, to the extent that defendants do bargain away their Apprendi 
rights, the procedural tax will indeed be lifted, but in a manner that is 
consistent with the goal of limiting state power, for defendants will likely 
receive concessions from prosecutors in the process. “Every new element 
that a prosecutor can threaten to charge is also an element that a defendant 
can threaten to contest at trial and make the prosecutor prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”199 
Finally, we reach the nub of the dissenters’ objection to Apprendi, the 
fairness point. A mandatory guidelines system that rests on jury fact-
finding will leave prosecutors with gatekeeping authority over the 
application of sentencing enhancements, and prosecutors will not ensure 
uniform results across cases.200 The Apprendi Five responded, however, 
that the system of “judicial” sentencing was plagued by its own uniformity 
problems: prosecutors had plenty of tools available to influence the 
sentence even in the world of judicial fact-finding, such as by making 
sentencing recommendations.201 Such tools could easily be used as 
bargaining chips, thereby creating the same sort of prosecutor-created 
disparity that the dissenters feared would arise post-Apprendi.202 
More fundamentally, though, there was the issue of perceived 
unfairness discussed above: in the world of judicial fact-finding, “a 
 
 
 198. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 312. 
 199. Id. at 311. Although not all would agree with this proposition, see Bibas, supra note 17, at 
198–99, Professors King and Klein have persuasively argued that the circumstances in which 
defendants would be worse off under Apprendi are narrow and unusual. Nancy J. King & Susan R. 
Klein, Apprendi and Plea Bargaining, 54 STAN. L. REV. 295, 306–07 (2001). 
 200. Note that the same uniformity concerns might be raised as to discretionary sentencing 
systems. It is important, however, to recall that discretionary sentencing can be implemented in a 
variety of ways other than through the traditional system of completely unguided discretion. Such 
alternative approaches may, in fact, be effective in achieving uniformity goals. See Hunt & Connelly, 
supra note 74, at 235 (discussing higher compliance rates with advisory guidelines in some states than 
with presumptive guidelines in other states). 
 201. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 311. 
 202. This is one of several reasons why I have argued that the dissenters greatly overstated the 
uniformity in federal sentencing prior to Booker. Michael M. O’Hear, The Myth of Uniformity, 17 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 249 (2005). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 835 Ohear book pages.doc8/31/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
874 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:835 
 
 
 
 
defendant, with no warning in either his indictment or plea, would 
routinely see his maximum potential sentence balloon from as little as five 
years to as much as life imprisonment . . . .”203 Note the very different 
views of what constitutes fairness from the perspective of the dissenters 
(whose objective is the “systematic fairness” of consistent results across 
the run of cases)204 and the majority (who concentrate on the perceptions 
of individual defendants in light of the expectations established by earlier 
proceedings in their own cases).205 Seen through the latter lens, the 
Apprendi canon can indeed be viewed as providing a fairness benefit to 
defendants, even in the absence of a greater number of jury trials. 
d. Summary 
The Apprendi Five repeatedly rejected the charge of doctrinaire 
formalism and instead asserted that they were advancing democratic, 
libertarian, and fairness values in a meaningful way. One does not have to 
agree fully with all of their contentions to acknowledge that they could, in 
good faith, lay claim to the consequentialist high ground. In any event, 
what is important for present purposes is not whether the Five ultimately 
had the better of the argument with the dissenters, but what the Five 
should think of Bordenkircher, assuming that they really meant what they 
said in the Apprendi decisions. 
The Five expected that their decisions would cause some jurisdictions 
to enhance judicial discretion and others to create a formal role for juries 
in the sentencing process. Their alignment in the Booker remedy opinions 
suggests that one of the Five (Justice Ginsburg) preferred the discretion 
option, while the other four preferred the jury option. In any event, they 
plainly viewed both options as constitutionally acceptable and preferable 
to the pre-Apprendi world of sentence enhancements triggered by judicial 
fact-finding. 
Finally, Apprendi’s consequentialism seems influenced by the view 
that (as BLE scholars put it) “people evaluate outcomes based on the 
change they represent from an initial reference point, rather than based on 
 
 
 203. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 311. 
 204. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 339 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Interestingly, although the dissenters framed 
the uniformity issue as one of abstract, system-wide fairness, they might have reframed the issue in 
ways that were more in line with the majority’s subjective understanding of fairness. Sentencing 
reformers in the 1970s and 1980s frequently argued that sentencing disparities were a source of great 
unhappiness among prisoners. O’Hear, supra note 18, at 760, 772–73 n.127. 
 205.  See supra text accompanying note 204. 
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the nature of the outcome itself.”206 This insight helps to explain 
Apprendi’s dismissal of the inversion argument, as well as the contrasting 
definitions of fairness employed by the majority and dissenters. For this 
reason, we might usefully think about Apprendi’s consequentialism as 
“biased-actor” consequentialism, differentiating it from a “rational-actor” 
consequentialism that predicts and evaluates consequences on the 
traditional homo economicus model, in which people think about 
outcomes without regard to the path by which the outcomes are reached. 
III. THE CONFLICTING VISIONS OF APPRENDI AND BORDENKIRCHER 
This Part elaborates on the deep-seated conflict between the Apprendi 
decisions and Bordenkircher. This conflict has two dimensions: (1) the 
relative value ascribed to bureaucratic efficiency in the criminal justice 
system, and (2) the use of rational-actor assumptions. 
A. Common-Law Values Versus Bureaucratic Efficiency 
The Apprendi decisions were not framed as narrowly addressed to 
technical questions of law, but rather the decisions purported to select one 
“paradigm for criminal justice” over another: “the common-law ideal of 
limited state power” over “the civil-law ideal of administrative 
perfection,”207 the “common-sense judgment” of the jury over the “more 
tutored” judgment of the legal professionals.208 Bordenkircher also 
reflected an underlying choice of paradigms, but the paradigm chosen was 
the one that lost in the Apprendi cases. The Bordenkircher Court 
concluded that guilty pleas were an “important component[] of this 
country’s criminal justice system;”209 characterized its prior decisions as 
not merely tolerating, but “encouraging,” the inducement of pleas;210 and 
indicated that its “acceptance of the basic legitimacy” of the practice 
necessitated deference to the prosecutor’s choice of tactics.211 
Bordenkircher’s vision of unconstrained plea-inducement is profoundly at 
odds with Apprendi’s paradigm. It is a system dominated by legal 
 
 
 206. Jolls et al., supra note 19, at 1535 (citing Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect 
Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979)). 
 207. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313. 
 208. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155–56 
(1968)). 
 209. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 361 (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 
(1977)). 
 210. Id. at 364. 
 211. Id. at 363–64. 
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professionals, with no room for the “common-sense judgment” of jurors. 
Although the system may boast considerable speed and efficiency, the 
Apprendi decisions repeatedly rejected the centrality of these virtues.212 
To be sure, the Apprendi Five did not anticipate that their decisions 
would turn back the clock to a time when jury trials were the norm in the 
criminal justice system.213 But they suggested that, even in the absence of 
common-law practices, the Constitution should be interpreted so as to 
safeguard common-law values, most notably, the value of maintaining a 
robust check on the ability of prosecutors to impose disproportionate 
punishments on an arbitrary or vindictive basis. The repeated reference in 
the Apprendi decisions to the common-law tradition of pious perjury is 
telling. 
Heavy-handed charging threats, a la Bordenkircher, embody contempt 
for the common-law values of checks and balances in the criminal justice 
system. They send defendants a message that only the prosecutor’s view 
of the case counts, and that the system accords little actual value to their 
formal rights to be heard.214 Moreover, the inconsistencies between 
Apprendi and Bordenkircher go beyond such symbolic considerations.215 
 
 
 212. See, e.g., Ring, 536 U.S. at 607 (“It has never been efficient; but it has always been free.”) 
(quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring)). As the Apprendi 
decisions suggest, efficiency did not become a central preoccupation of the criminal justice system 
until well after the framing of the Sixth Amendment. See Nancy Jean King, Priceless Process: 
Nonnegotiable Features of Criminal Litigation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 113, 121–23 (1999) (describing 
emergence of efficiency concerns in late 1800s and early 1900s). 
 213. See King, supra note 212, at 119–20 (“Courts of the nineteenth century would have ridiculed 
the idea that an accused and a prosecutor could dicker over what kind of break the defendant deserves 
for waiving a piece of the criminal process.”). 
 214. Professors Scott and Stuntz have a wonderful analogy for Bordenkircher that nicely captures 
this aspect of the prosecutor’s actions: 
The . . . analogy is . . . the lone gas station in the middle of the desert that charges fifty dollars 
for a gallon of gas. Like the prosecutor in Bordenkircher, the gas station usually gets its 
asking price, because the difference between that price and the cost of going without (death in 
the desert) is so high. . . . Imagine, however, that the gas station owner goes further. Figuring 
that the buyer will kick and scream and haggle for an hour, but will eventually agree to the 
seller’s price, the seller decides to cut the negotiation short by letting the air out of the buyer’s 
tires and offering to refill the tires if, but only if, the buyer pays the seller’s asking price for 
gas. 
Scott & Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1964.  
 215. As a growing body of social psychology research suggests, symbolism itself can play an 
important role in the ability of the criminal justice system to achieve its objective of enhancing public 
compliance with the mandates of the law and legal institutions. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. 
HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 83–
84 (2002) (discussing study showing that people’s views of procedural justice are heavily influenced 
by such considerations as whether decisionmakers are polite and show concern for people’s rights); 
Larry Heuer, What’s Just About the Criminal Justice System? A Psychological Perspective, 13 J.L. & 
POL’Y 209, 226 (2005) (“Fair treatment enhances satisfaction with the criminal justice system and 
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If prosecutors have a free hand to raise the stakes in a jury trial as high as 
they wish, then only the most impetuous defendants will dare to invoke the 
protection from government overreaching that is potentially afforded by a 
jury. The availability of the jury is thereby effectively curtailed. And those 
who dare to resist the pressure, like Paul Hayes, may pay an extraordinary 
price for doing so. Ironically, those who ask a jury to determine whether 
the government is overreaching may thereby assure that they become 
victims of overreaching. 
One response to all of this, of course, is that, however troubling 
charging threats might be, it is futile to regulate them. Prosecutors will 
simply file more aggressive initial charges, switching from “threats” to 
“offers,” with equally coercive effects. This argument, analogous to the 
inversion argument made by the Apprendi dissenters, is considered in the 
next section. 
B. Biased Actors Versus Rational Actors 
Bordenkircher’s consequentialism parallels that of the Apprendi 
dissenters. This becomes most apparent by reconsidering a portion of 
Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Bordenkircher, specifically, his response to 
the majority’s view that regulating the low-to-high strategy would merely 
cause prosecutors to switch to the seemingly equivalent high-to-low 
approach. Blackmun identified three reasons why high-to-low was actually 
preferable to low-to-high. These three reasons resonate with the thinking 
behind the Apprendi decisions and indicate why the Apprendi Five should 
find Bordenkircher’s analysis unpersuasive.216 
First, Blackmun argued, under the high-to-low approach, the 
prosecutor is required to reach a charging decision without any knowledge 
of the particular defendant’s willingness to plead guilty; hence the 
defendant who truly believes himself to be innocent, and wishes for that 
reason to go to trial, is not likely to be subject to quite such a devastating 
gamble since the prosecutor has fixed the incentives for the average 
 
 
improves perceptions of the legitimacy of the law and of the authorities who enforce it. . . . Perceptions 
of fair treatment are heavily influenced by symbolic criteria, such as politeness and respect.”).  
 216. In drawing on BLE to help better understand plea bargaining dynamics, I am following the 
lead of Professor Bibas in his recent pathbreaking article on the subject. See Bibas, supra note 160. I 
am adding to his analysis in two respects. First, although Bibas concentrated on the effects of cognitive 
bias on defendants, I also here consider the effects on prosecutors. Second, rather than considering 
plea inducements in an undifferentiated way, I attempt here to distinguish between the perceptions of 
low-to-high and high-to-low tactics. 
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case.217 The reasoning here parallels Stevens’s argument in Apprendi that 
legislatures will not really increase penalties across the board and convert 
aggravators into mitigators: both arguments assume a subtle, practical 
check on the ability of politically responsive state actors to inflate 
penalties, even if the inflated penalties merely operate, at a formal level, as 
a starting point in the analysis.  
In a world of unbounded rationality, it is not clear why a prosecutor 
going from high to low would base her initial charge on the “average 
case,” rather than charging the legally permissible maximum.218 In a world 
of cognitive bias, however, a number of justifications for the practice are 
apparent. The prosecutor’s selection of a disproportionately serious charge 
may have powerful anchoring effects. The prosecutor may appreciate the 
difficulty that she would have in moving a great distance down from the 
initial charge, and avoid gross overcharging on that basis; she will 
understand that if she cannot move far enough down from the initial 
charge, she risks wrecking the plea negotiations.219 Moreover, an eventual 
conviction of a disproportionately high charge, whether by trial or plea, 
may be undesirable in and of itself as the prosecutor may fear the 
exhaustion of limited criminal justice resources on relatively minor cases 
or an adverse public reaction to undue prosecutorial harshness.220 
 
 
 217. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 368 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 218. To be sure, ethical standards for prosecutors prohibit using charges “only as a leverage 
device in obtaining guilty pleas to lesser charges.” NAT’L DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASS’N, NATIONAL 
PROSECUTION STANDARDS 130 (2d ed. 1991). Such standards, however, are not enforceable. See id. at 
5 (noting that standards are not intended to be basis for sanctions). Our present concern, moreover, is 
not with prosecutors who rigorously adhere to the standards, but with prosecutors who already use the 
threat of enhanced charges to obtain plea bargaining leverage, and the extent to which they would 
simply switch to a different leveraging tactic if prohibited from using threats.  
 219. As BLE scholars have observed, people in a variety of contexts recognize and take steps to 
address the boundedness of their willpower, as by joining “Christmas Clubs” in order to avoid 
undersaving. Jolls et al., supra note 19, at 1479.  
 220. Prosecutors do not always seek the harshest sentence available in every case. Indeed, there is 
ample evidence that prosecutors will sometimes even act so as to subvert mandatory sentencing 
guidelines in order to achieve what they believe to be a more appropriate set of sentences. See, e.g., 
Frank O. Bowman, III, & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An Empirical Analysis of Declining 
Federal Drug Sentences Including Data From the District Level, 87 IOWA L. REV. 477, 559 (2002) 
(“Our work demonstrates that prosecutors . . . use their discretion liberally, but irregularly, to reduce 
drug sentences.”). See generally Stuntz, supra note 188, at 2554 (“Once the defendant’s sentence has 
reached the level the prosecutor prefers—or, if you like, the level that the local voters who elect her 
boss demand—adding more time offers no benefit to the prosecutor. . . . Voters’ preferences, 
courthouse customs, the prosecutor’s reputation as a tough or lenient bargainer, her own views about 
what is a proper sentence for the crime in question—all these things play a role in defining the 
sentences that prosecutors are likely to seek in plea bargains.”). See also id. at 2257 (“[W]ho bears the 
blame if something goes wrong—if sympathetic defendants are punished or if unsympathetic 
defendants are punished more harshly than the public thinks just? In the United States, the answer is 
almost always the overzealous prosecutor, not the overcriminalizing or oversentencing legislator.”). 
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Adding weight to the anchoring effects, there are also framing effects. 
Movement up in charges will be seen by victims and the public as a loss 
for defendants, but movement down represents a win. In light of tough-on-
crime political pressures, the prosecutor will want to be careful about 
routinely handing out big wins to defendants. This consideration, too, 
would militate against indiscriminately maximizing initial charges; it is 
better to set initial charges with some modesty so that defendants will 
usually get only small wins in plea negotiations.221 
Finally, there is the principle of reciprocal fairness: a prosecutor who 
significantly overcharges risks being perceived as unfair by opposing 
counsel, which may prompt spiteful responses that make the prosecutor’s 
life more difficult such as more filing of pretrial motions.222 Similarly, 
unfair overcharging may leave some defendants feeling more reluctant to 
plead guilty or otherwise cooperate with prosecutors. In short, Blackmun’s 
assumptions about prosecutorial charging restraint seem at least plausible 
in a world of bounded rationality and willpower. 
The second reason Blackmun found the high-to-low approach 
preferable to low-to-high was the greater transparency and public 
accountability that would be possible if the consideration for the 
defendant’s plea were a matter of public record, and not embodied merely 
in “unrecorded verbal warnings of more serious indictments yet to 
come.”223 This argument, like the first, also rests on an assumption of 
prosecutorial restraint in determining the initial charges. Consider an 
example: a defendant is initially charged with second-degree murder, but 
pursuant to an agreement, ultimately pleads guilty only to reckless 
endangerment. What is the public to make of this deal? At first blush, it 
appears that the prosecutor paid a high price for the defendant’s guilty 
plea. In the world of the Bordenkircher majority, however, the initial 
murder charge may have been far more than the prosecutor actually 
thought appropriate, a massive overcharge intended to ensure that only the 
most impetuous defendant would actually go to trial. In the dissenters’ 
 
 
 221. Not only may prosecutors arouse a negative public reaction by handing out big wins, but they 
may also run into difficulties in having their plea deals approved by judges. See King, supra note 212, 
at 136 (noting that in all jurisdictions judges retain authority to review and reject plea deals). For an 
example, see Dan Christensen, Florida Judge Complains U.S. Prosecutor Is “Weak-Kneed,” MIAMI 
DAILY BUS. REV., Mar. 18, 2004, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1079144426509 
(discussing case in which judge threatened to reject plea deal in which prosecutor agreed to dismiss 
two felony drug distribution counts in return for guilty plea to one misdemeanor possession charge). 
 222. For a discussion of social science research on spiteful responses to perceived unfairness, see 
Jolls et al., supra note 19, at 1494–96.  
 223. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 369 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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world, however, prosecutors act in a more restrained fashion, only 
overcharging to the relatively modest extent necessary to secure a guilty 
plea from the average defendant. In the dissenters’ world, the public can 
more confidently conclude that the prosecutor has indeed moved a long 
distance from what she initially judged to be an appropriate disposition of 
the case. 
Third, Blackmun questioned whether it was fair to pressure defendants 
to plead guilty by threatening an enhanced charge “when the defendant has 
no way of knowing whether the prosecutor would indeed be entitled to 
bring him to trial on the enhanced charge.”224 The objection, of course, is 
that defendants always bargain in the face of uncertain trial outcomes;225 it 
is not clear why the modest additional layer of uncertainty in 
Bordenkircher should be accorded particular significance.  
Blackmun is nonetheless onto something by raising fairness concerns. 
A threat is perceived differently than an offer: the former is framed as a 
loss, and the latter as a gain. Powerful loss-aversion instincts may lend 
considerably greater coercive power to a threat than to an offer. BLE 
scholars have shown that people will go to irrational extremes in order to 
avoid a loss,226 which ought to raise concerns about whether guilty pleas 
are as well-considered when made in response to a threat as they are when 
made in response to an offer.227 This BLE-based analysis, moreover, 
resonates with leading theories of coercion in the philosophical 
literature.228 
 
 
 224. Id. 
 225. See Bibas, supra note 160, at 2493–96 (discussing information deficits that plague plea 
negotiations). 
 226. Id. at 2508. Defense lawyers might, in principle, serve as debiasers for their clients, but, as 
Professor Bibas has observed, “[l]awyers vary widely in their knowledge, skill, and incentives to 
debias their clients.” Id. at 2520. 
 227. See Wright, supra note 197, at 84 (arguing that declining federal acquittal rates, combined 
with high usage of prosecutor-controlled sentencing discounts, demonstrate that prosecutors have 
accumulated too much power to extract guilty pleas from defendants who might otherwise win 
acquittals at trial). A number of recent police misconduct scandals provide further anecdotal evidence 
that even innocent defendants will sometimes take plea deals in order to avoid the risks of going to 
trial. Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2305 (2006). 
 228. For purposes of distinguishing between threats and offers, and thereby determining when 
proposals are coercive, leading theories in the philosophical literature also rely on the notion of 
changes to a baseline. See Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 101, 
102–04 (Peter Laslett et al. eds., 1972) (discussing conditions necessary for threat to be considered 
coercion); ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 136 (1987) (discussing difficulty of determining baseline in 
plea-inducement context); Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a 
Workable Test for Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 465, 525–26, 530 (2005) 
(summarizing literature); George C. Thomas III, A Philosophical Account of Coerced Self-
Incrimination, 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 79, 86 (1993) (“[A] proposal is a threat only when it makes . . . 
[a person’s] condition worse; and it is an offer when it makes . . . [a person’s condition] better.”). This 
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p 835 Ohear book pages.doc8/31/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] THE END OF BORDENKIRCHER 881 
 
 
 
 
The defendant, at any rate, is likely at least to perceive himself treated 
less fairly in the threat scenario: his expectations are shaped by the charges 
initially filed, but then the prosecutor suddenly brings the possibility of 
much worse losses into view. This echoes Blakely’s fairness objections to 
charging a defendant in a way that indicates one particular maximum 
penalty, then punishing him in a way that far exceeds the maximum. And, 
as a growing body of social science research indicates, perceptions of fair 
treatment can play an important role in building respect for, and hence 
compliance with, the law and legal authorities.229 
In sum, the Apprendi Five should not find the Bordenkircher evasion 
argument any more persuasive than they found the evasion arguments 
made by the Apprendi dissenters. There are good reasons to doubt that 
regulation of charging threats would result in dramatic inflation of initial 
charges. And, even to the extent that some inflation does occur, there may 
nonetheless be reasons to view high-to-low charging as preferable to low-
to-high. High-to-low is more transparent to the public, and is likely 
perceived by defendants as less coercive and unfair. 
IV. DESIGNING A NEW RULE FOR CHARGING THREATS 
The previous Part demonstrated why the Apprendi Five should reject 
Bordenkircher. Assume now that the Court actually grants certiorari in a 
 
 
literature identifies three ways of determining the baseline: empirical (i.e., what is statistically likely to 
occur absent the proposal), phenomenological (i.e., what is subjectively expected to occur absent the 
proposal), and normative (i.e., what is expected assuming compliance with moral norms). Thomas, 
supra, at 87–88. Assuming that charges are not usually enhanced after they are formally made, and 
that defendants do not expect them to be enhanced, then a Bordenkircher-style proposal would amount 
to a threat in light of either the empirical or the phenomenological baseline and if different baselines 
produce different results, then the right baseline to use would be one that reflects the defendant’s 
preference as to the future).  Thomas, supra, at 89. Assuming that the prosecutor intends to deliver a 
threat and that the threat actually causes the defendant to plead guilty, then the chief conditions of 
coercion have been satisfied. See Thomas, supra, at 83 (outlining basic conditions of coercion).  
 229. See supra note 215. In contrast to the bait-and-switch character of low-to-high charging, 
high-to-low negotiations are not necessarily as crass as they are sometimes imagined. See Gerard E. 
Lynch, Screening Versus Bargaining: What Exactly Are We Trading Off?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1399, 
1403 (2003) (“Most plea negotiations, in fact, are primarily discussions of the merits of the case, in 
which defense attorneys point out legal, evidentiary, or practical weaknesses in the prosecutor’s case, 
or mitigating circumstances that merit mercy, and argue based on these considerations that the 
defendant is entitled to a more lenient disposition than that originally proposed by the prosecutor’s 
charge.”). But cf. MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, 
JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 41 (1977, paperback ed. 1981) (finding within single state system 
substantial differences in length of plea discussions and thoroughness with which facts of case were 
covered); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
1409, 1413–14 (2003) (asserting that Lynch’s description of plea bargaining, while perhaps accurate as 
to the federal system, does not match the reality of state court practice). 
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new case that presents a similar fact pattern, with a prosecutor delivering 
on a threat of new charges following a break-down in plea negotiations. 
This Part considers how the Five might address a hypothetical 
Bordenkircher II.230 Section A discusses potential ways that a protective 
rule might be structured by the Court. Section B considers the possibility 
that Justice Stevens, the only holdover on the Court from the 
Bordenkircher majority, might defect from the Five in a hypothetical 
Bordenkircher II. Finally, Section C considers the consequences of the 
proposed rule in more detail, showing that the “doctrinaire formalism” 
charge would no more fairly apply in this context than in the Apprendi 
cases.  
A. Structural Options 
Part I above described the contrasting protective rules proposed by the 
dissenters in Bordenkircher and Goodwin. This Section considers which of 
the rules would be most attractive to the Apprendi Five, concluding that 
Justice Brennan’s likelihood-of-deterrence test squares nicely with the 
Apprendi model. 
1. Powell’s Wag-the-Dog Test 
Justice Powell’s dissent in Bordenkircher suggested a case-by-case 
analysis of whether the trial penalty imposed by the prosecutor exceeded 
the State’s legitimate interests in punishing the defendant. Powell’s test 
offers flexibility and, assuming the sort of generous understanding of the 
scope of the State’s interests suggested by Powell, only minimal 
intrusiveness by judges into the charging and plea-inducement process.  
Note, however, the basic jurisprudential inconsistency between 
Powell’s approach and the Apprendi decisions. Powell’s test employs a 
standard, instead of a rule, in contrast to Apprendi’s preference for rule-
structure formalism. Powell’s approach, leaving wide discretion in the 
judiciary, offers little reassurance that jury-trial rights will not be 
progressively eroded, particularly given the institutional incentives for 
judges to support prosecutorial practices that result in more guilty pleas 
 
 
 230. Although this Part is written with the possibility of a new United States Supreme Court case 
in mind, the proposal developed here might alternatively be adopted by state courts using their 
independent authority to construe due process rights under their own state constitutions. 
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and fewer trials.231 For that reason, the Apprendi Five are unlikely to unite 
behind a wag-the-dog test. 
2. Blackmun’s Actual-Motivation Test 
Blackmun’s dissent in Bordenkircher suggested a different approach: 
rather than focusing on the state’s interests in punishment, the inquiry 
should turn on the prosecutor’s actual motivation in bringing enhanced 
charges.232 Where a new charge is added after plea negotiations fail, a 
burden-shifting analysis is triggered, requiring the prosecutor to justify her 
action on some non-vindictive basis.233 Blackmun seems to have 
contemplated something like the Batson test for racial discrimination in 
jury selection, which makes use of a similar burden-shifting approach en 
route to a determination of whether the prosecutor discriminated against a 
group of prospective jurors on account of their race.234 
The Batson analogy, however, demonstrates the basic objection to 
Blackmun’s approach. Batson has proven notoriously ineffectual in 
practice. Prosecutors have little difficulty in providing race-neutral 
explanations for their peremptory strikes, and courts have little stomach 
for probing their actual motivations once a facially neutral explanation is 
offered.235 Likewise, one imagines that reasonably intelligent prosecutors 
will always be able to point to something that has changed in order to 
justify increased charges after the break-down in plea negotiations: an 
investigator has come up with a new item of evidence, a victim’s injuries 
have taken longer than anticipated to heal, the prosecutor has just learned 
of a favorable appellate decision, etc. Given the ephemeral nature of actual 
 
 
 231. See Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 
1037–38 (2006) (arguing in favor of greater use of formalist rules to preserve separation of powers in 
criminal justice system); Stuntz, supra note 188, at 2561 (discussing evidence that judges “are invested 
in plea bargaining and try to facilitate it”) (citing HEUMANN, supra note 229, at 144–48). Professor 
Stuntz has suggested a modified version of the wag-the-dog test, in which the government would be 
required to “point to some reasonable number of factually similar cases in which the threatened 
sentence had actually been imposed, not just threatened.” Stuntz, supra note 10, at 373. This seems a 
move in the right direction, although, as Stuntz himself acknowledges, not all states collect the sort of 
data that would make the required showing possible. Additionally, the proposed requirement might 
still be overly indeterminate and deferential for the tastes of the Apprendi Five, leaving open the 
questions of what is a “reasonable number” and how to know when cases are sufficiently “factually 
similar” to count as suitable comparisons.  
 232. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 233. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 234. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 235. For a recent critique of this Batson case law along these lines, see Antony Page, Batson’s 
Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 166–78 
(2005). 
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motives, the judge will have considerable “wiggle room” to find in favor 
of the prosecutor once such a neutral explanation is offered. And, given 
the institutional incentives to support plea-bargained outcomes, one 
imagines that judges will liberally make use of this wiggle room, just as 
they have in the Batson context. In short, Blackmun’s test offers hardly 
any firmer protection against the erosion of jury-trial rights than Powell’s. 
3. Brennan’s Likelihood-of-Deterrence Test 
Justice Brennan suggested a third approach in his Goodwin dissent. 
Brennan would ask, “Did the elevation of the charges . . . pose a realistic 
likelihood of vindictiveness? Is it possible that the fear of such 
vindictiveness may . . . deter a person in [the defendant’s] position from 
exercising his . . . right to a jury trial?”236 This test focuses neither on the 
propriety of the charge in the abstract (Powell’s test) nor on the 
prosecutor’s motive in bringing the charge (Blackmun’s test), but on the 
deterrent effects of bringing the charge in the manner in which it was 
brought. 
a. Adapting the Test to Charging Threats 
Goodwin did not involve an express Bordenkircher-style threat, but it 
is not hard to imagine how Brennan would have applied his test in such 
circumstances. Where a prosecutor threatens and then delivers an 
increased charge in response to a refusal to plead guilty, defendants will 
undoubtedly perceive vindictiveness, and there is at least a realistic 
likelihood that some will be deterred from exercising their procedural 
rights. Brennan’s likelihood-of-deterrent-effects approach might thus be 
adapted to the Bordenkircher scenario through the following rule: The Due 
Process Clause is violated when, after a defendant has been indicted or 
otherwise formally charged, the prosecutor (a) makes a plea offer; (b) in 
connection with the offer, threatens to take an action that exposes the 
defendant to a longer maximum sentence than would otherwise be possible 
based on the existing charge(s); and (c) takes such an action following the 
defendant’s rejection of the offer. 
In light of the clarity of the rule, it should be easy for prosecutors to 
avoid running afoul of it. If a prosecutor has a potential charge that he or 
she would like to use as a bargaining chip, then the prosecutor has two 
 
 
 236. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 389–90 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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choices: either (1) convey the terms of the proposed deal prior to the 
formalization of charges in an indictment or information, or (2) include the 
charge in the indictment or information. Once post-charging plea 
negotiations begin, the charge might still be added, but only until there is 
an express threat relating to the charge, at which time the prosecutor 
would lose the ability to add the charge. (And even at that point, the 
prosecutor would still be able to employ any other form of plea-
inducement that did not increase the defendant’s overall sentencing 
exposure, for instance, a promise to stand silent at sentencing.) In order to 
maintain flexibility in modifying charges, prosecutors would thus have a 
strong incentive never to make a post-charging threat. 
Using the rule, a defendant’s proof of vindictiveness in the 
Bordenkircher-type setting would turn on a handful of objective facts, 
which should not involve protracted collateral litigation or undue intrusion 
into the inner workings of the prosecutor’s office. To be sure, the rule, as 
framed here, contains a few legal ambiguities whose resolution I will 
leave for another day.237 Yet the presence of such legal questions does not 
render the rule any less bright-line than the Apprendi test, which has also 
raised its fair share of legal questions. 
b. Consistency with Apprendi (and Other Precedent) 
The Apprendi Five should find the proposed rule preferable not only to 
the open-ended permissiveness of Bordenkircher, but also to the 
Blackmun or Powell approaches. The structure of this rule echoes the 
formalism of Apprendi, avoiding ephemeral considerations, such as state 
interests and prosecutorial intent, in favor of more objective fact-finding. 
Moreover, like the Apprendi test, the proposed test focuses squarely on the 
fairness of the process to which the defendant was subjected, without 
regard for the fairness of the outcome as an abstract proposition.238 Finally, 
like the Apprendi rule (as clarified in Harris), the proposed test makes the 
maximum available sentence the touchstone of the analysis; it constitutes a 
 
 
 237. For instance, it would be too easy for prosecutors to evade the rule if they were narrowly 
prohibited from bringing only a specific charge that was expressly mentioned in a threat. But how 
much broader should the prohibition extend? To all charges that would satisfy the double jeopardy 
“same elements” test? Or more broadly to all transactionally related charges? Likewise, should an 
analog to the double jeopardy dual sovereignty doctrine apply in this context? And what about 
charging threats that do not increase the potential maximum prison term (the standard metric for 
punishment severity), but instead increase sentencing exposure in other respects, such as by triggering 
a forfeiture statute that would not otherwise apply? 
 238. For instance, the Apprendi Court nowhere asked whether twelve years was, in the abstract, a 
just sentence for the defendant’s crime. 
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baseline against which subsequent changes are assessed. This test, in short, 
is what the Court should adopt in Bordenkircher II. 
Interestingly, parallels to this rule can be found in other areas of 
criminal procedure law. Consider, for instance, the Court’s decisions 
regarding a defendant’s invocation of his right to remain silent at trial: the 
Court’s protective rule prohibits the imposition of any penalty on the 
defendant for exercising the right, without regard to such subjective 
matters as severity or state of mind.239 Griffin v. California240 offers a 
classic example. During closing arguments, the prosecutor urged the jury 
to draw a negative inference against the defendant because the defendant 
refused to testify.241 The Court subsequently found the argument 
unconstitutional, observing that an adverse comment on the refusal to 
testify “is a penalty . . . for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts 
down on the privilege by making its assertion costly.”242 Likewise, the 
proposed Bordenkircher II test prohibits prosecutor-imposed penalties that 
make assertion of the jury-trial right “costly.”  
That said, the approach advocated here is concededly at tension with 
two other lines of cases: the pre-Bordenkircher cases that approve of plea 
inducements, and Goodwin and its progeny. Neither set of cases, however, 
must necessarily be overturned. Blakely indicates that plea-inducements 
are not inconsistent with “common-law values” as long as juries are at 
least available as a meaningful check on government over-reaching.243 In 
this spirit, the proposed test does not target plea inducements generally, 
but only a particular form of plea inducement that raises especially strong 
coercion and fairness concerns. As to Goodwin and its progeny,244 the 
proposed test does indeed jettison Goodwin’s system of presumptions and 
burden-shifting, but only in a narrow set of circumstances; otherwise, the 
Goodwin test still applies. The special carve-out might be justified based 
on the repeated assertions by the Apprendi Five that the jury-trial right, 
consistent with the Framers’ intent, requires particular vigilance to prevent 
its erosion.245 Moreover, the proposed rule targets a particular set of 
 
 
 239. For a succinct discussion of the cases, see Godsey, supra note 228, at 492–95. 
 240. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
 241. Id. at 610–11. 
 242. Id. at 614. 
 243.  Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 312 (2004). 
 244. See, e.g., Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989). 
 245. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 246–47 (1999). Thus, the proposed rule might 
not encompass threats that are not directed to a waiver of the jury-trial right, for instance, when a 
prosecutor threatens enhanced charges solely to obtain a waiver of the right to appeal, to contest a 
sentence enhancement, or to contest civil remedies. Likewise, charging threats directed to obtaining 
the defendant’s testimony against another person might not be included. In practice, however, it is 
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circumstances in which there can be little doubt that the prosecutor’s 
purpose was to discourage exercise of the right, thereby rendering 
Goodwin’s intent-determination inquiry superfluous. 
This is not to say that the Five should necessarily avoid a broader 
reconsideration of the vindictiveness and plea-inducement case law, but, 
rather, to suggest that they can proceed incrementally, precisely as they 
have done in the Apprendi line of cases. The charging-threat issue can be 
addressed through a narrow holding that leaves other precedent, besides 
Bordenkircher itself, intact. 
B. Should Stevens Adhere to Bordenkircher? 
As the only member of the Apprendi Five who voted with the majority 
in Bordenkircher, Justice Stevens requires separate consideration. Should 
he be willing to reconsider that vote today? In fact, Stevens’s opinion for 
the Court in Goodwin suggests that his views are no longer wholly in sync 
with Bordenkircher.246 Where Bordenkircher suggested no limitation on 
plea inducements, Goodwin seemed to contemplate some sort of wag-the-
dog limitation. Moreover, the fact that Justice Powell (author of the wag-
the-dog dissent in Bordenkircher) actually joined the Goodwin majority 
lends support to the view that the Court (and Stevens) had moved between 
the two opinions.  
Assuming that Stevens does indeed agree with the propriety of 
regulating plea inducements, would he accept the (rule-structure) formalist 
 
 
often impossible to disentangle the various motives behind a charging threat. Usually the prosecutor 
seeks the defendant’s waiver of a bundle of rights together. In order to make the proposed rule 
meaningful, it should encompass “mixed-motive” scenarios, in which a waiver of the jury trial is part 
of the package sought by the prosecutor. 
 246. Indeed, Stevens actually seemed to move away from the most extreme reading of 
Bordenkircher the very next term with his dissent in Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978). 
Corbitt challenged the constitutionality of a New Jersey statute that mandated life imprisonment for 
defendants convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, but permitted a lesser penalty for defendants 
who pled out. Id. at 215–16. In upholding the statute, the majority relied heavily on Bordenkircher. Id. 
at 221–22. Stevens, in dissent, conceded that the New Jersey statute served the same state interest as 
do plea inducements delivered by prosecutors, id. at 231 (Stevens, J., dissenting), but rejected the 
majority’s suggestion that the basic legitimacy of this interest shielded all state action in furtherance of 
it. Rather, what made the New Jersey statute different than Bordenkircher-type threats was that the 
statute mandated “a different standard of punishment depending solely on whether or not a plea is 
entered.” Id. at 232 (emphasis added). By contrast, he assumed that prosecutors would consider 
“individual factors relevant to the particular case,” rather than making charging decisions based solely 
on the defendant’s plea. Id. at 231–32. Stevens seems to be anticipating Goodwin and backing away 
from Bordenkircher’s open-ended deference. See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 n.11 
(1982) (“A charging decision does not levy an improper ‘penalty’ unless it results solely from the 
defendant’s exercise of a protected legal right . . . .”) (emphasis added).  
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test proposed here, or would he continue to prefer the wag-the-dog test of 
Goodwin? There are at least two good reasons to believe that Stevens 
would prefer the proposed test. 
First, he embraced an analogous test in his McMillan dissent and the 
subsequent Apprendi cases. Recall that, in McMillan, Stevens 
acknowledged that this test would be easy to circumvent in principle, but 
argued that political realities would prevent circumvention in practice. As 
suggested in the previous Part, similar arguments might be made in 
response to concerns about the circumvention of a formalist rule 
restricting charging threats.  
Second, in the years since Bordenkircher and Goodwin, the plea-
inducement playing field has tilted dramatically in favor of prosecutors, 
creating much more compelling risks that defendants will be effectively 
coerced into surrendering their trial rights. At the time Bordenkircher was 
decided, draconian sentencing statutes, like Kentucky’s Habitual Criminal 
Act, were comparatively rare. Indeed, Kentucky’s Act was actually 
softened not long after Paul Hayes’s sentencing.247 Subsequent decades 
have held a different story. Pennsylvania, for instance, enacted the 
mandatory minimum statute at issue in McMillan in 1982,248 the very year 
Stevens wrote his opinion in Goodwin. In the years immediately following 
Goodwin, Congress began its biennial ritual of adopting new mandatory 
minimums at the federal level.249 Many states followed suit, with the trend 
perhaps reaching its apex with the adoption of California’s notorious 
three-strikes law in 1994.250 The upshot is that prosecutors now routinely 
have the ability to make the sort of extreme charging threats used against 
Paul Hayes. Although the holding in Bordenkircher rested, in part, on the 
Court’s view that prosecution and defense “arguably possess relatively 
equal bargaining power,”251 such an assertion would be nearly laughable 
today.252 
Stevens has been an acute and concerned observer of these trends, and 
he made note of them in his Apprendi and Booker opinions. Indeed, in 
 
 
 247. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 371 n.3 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 248. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 81, 97 (1986). 
 249. See Sandra Guerra Thompson, The Booker Project: The Future of Federal Sentencing, 43 
HOUS. L. REV. 269, 271 n.13 (summarizing important federal mandatory minimum statutes). 
 250. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE 
OUT IN CALIFORNIA ix (2001). 
 251. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 362 (citing Parkes v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809 (1970)). 
 252. See, e.g., LOWENTHAL, supra note 188, at 112 (describing defense lawyers’ “bitter[ness]” 
regarding “tilt of the playing field”); Standen, supra note 185, at 1473–74 (“[P]rosecutors [can] 
exercise substantial power to overwhelm criminal defendants in the plea bargaining process.”). 
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Booker, he framed the Apprendi line of cases this way: “As the 
enhancements became greater [after McMillan], the jury’s finding of the 
underlying crime became less significant. And the enhancements became 
very serious indeed. . . . [T]he Court was faced with the issue of 
preserving an ancient guarantee under a new set of circumstances.”253 
Similarly, this same “new set of circumstances” should cause Stevens 
to consider the need for modifying prosecutorial vindictiveness law in 
order to preserve the same “ancient guarantee.”254 Neither the open-ended 
permissiveness of Bordenkircher nor the nearly as deferential approach of 
Goodwin plausibly provides the sort of robust safeguard that Stevens later 
demanded in Apprendi. If Stevens takes the need for such a safeguard 
seriously, he should now be prepared to adopt a new approach. 
C. More “Doctrinaire Formalism?” 
Would modifying Bordenkircher as proposed be anything more than an 
exercise in “doctrinaire formalism?” Would the world really be made any 
different by the proposal, and, if so, would the changes be in any sense 
appealing ones? The previous Part set forth the basic argument that, taking 
into account the underlying logic of the Apprendi decisions, the Court 
could indeed regulate charging threats in a meaningful manner. With a 
specific proposal now on the table, this Section develops the earlier 
argument in a more detailed fashion. 
We should begin with an account of current charging and plea-
inducement practices. Characterizing such practices is a difficult task, for 
every prosecutorial office has its own policies and culture, and many 
offices leave considerable discretion in the hands of the line prosecutor. 
That said, one may hazard a few generalizations. First, in run-of-the-mill 
cases, initial charging decisions are often made by prosecutors based 
chiefly on information and recommendations supplied by police officers 
without a great deal of independent investigation, research, or 
deliberation.255 Thus, the prosecutor may have little information about, for 
 
 
 253. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 236–37 (2005) (citations omitted). 
 254. We may also note that the efficient case-processing concerns that were of such interest to the 
Court in Bordenkircher, decided at a time of increasing crimes rates and exploding criminal dockets, 
may be rather less compelling today, when crime and arrest rates have fallen. See SHANNON 
CATALANO, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN: CRIME VICTIMIZATION, 2005 5 (2006) 
(depicting decreases in violent and property crime rates from highs in the 1970s); U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, 
Table 4.2.2004, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t422004.pdf (showing increase in arrest rate 
per 100,000 inhabitants from 897.1 in 1971 to 1148.9 in 1982, then dropping to 788.4 in 2002).  
 255. The rigor of prosecutorial charge-screening may vary considerably by jurisdiction. Darryl K. 
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instance, potential defenses in the case, witness credibility issues and 
similar sources of litigation risk, and (other than criminal history) the 
background and character of the defendant.256 Second, given the broad 
scope and many overlapping provisions of contemporary criminal 
codes,257 as well as the low level of proof required to initiate a criminal 
case,258 the prosecutor will typically have a range of permissible charging 
options which will expose the defendant to greater or lesser degrees of 
punishment. Third, taking into account informational limitations and the 
need for later plea-inducement flexibility, initial charges are typically a bit 
harsher than what the prosecutor actually thinks would be the optimal 
resolution of the case.259 Fourth, the prosecutor will not typically pursue 
every conceivable charge in every case.260 Fifth, given that prosecutors, 
defense lawyers, and sometimes defendants themselves are repeat players 
in the system, prosecutors are usually (but not always) quite successful in 
setting an initial charge that permits enough downward movement to 
induce a plea while still producing a final result that lies within the range 
of what the prosecutor considers an appropriate response to the crime. 
Sixth, in addition to modifying charges, the prosecutor typically has a 
 
 
Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CAL. 
L. REV. 1585, 1600 n.47 (2005). For a description of the charging processes of the New Orleans 
District Attorney’s office, which devotes an extraordinary amount of resources and care to the initial 
charging decision, see Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 29, 62–63 (2002). 
 256. See Schulhofer, supra note 14, at 1983 (discussing information asymmetry between 
prosecution and defense). In some cases, prosecutors become actively involved in the investigative 
process. In such cases, prosecutors are apt to have more information available, but may be less able to 
assess the information in an unbiased manner. Brown, supra note 255, at 1600. Either way, the 
prosecutor may initiate criminal proceedings without a realistic sense of potential weaknesses in her 
case. One notable exception may be in federal white-collar cases, in which defense lawyers “almost 
always actively attempt, from a very early stage, to influence the conclusions of the prosecutor.” 
Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2126 
(1998). 
 257. See, e.g., LOWENTHAL, supra note 188, at 104–05 (describing charging options made possible 
by overlapping crime definitions in one case). 
 258. See id. at 98 (discussing probable cause standard used for charging purposes). 
 259. See Gazal-Ayal, supra note 227, at 2331 (discussing “safety margin” built into charging 
decisions). Professor Alschuler has provided a helpful taxonomy of “overcharging,” which includes 
vertical overcharging (“charging a single offense at a higher level than the circumstances of the case 
seem to warrant”) and different forms of horizontal overcharging (e.g., charging a defendant with a 
separate offense for each criminal transaction in which he participated). Albert W. Alschuler, The 
Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 85–87 (1968). 
 260. Charging restraint, however, varies among jurisdictions and by type of case. See, e.g., 
LOWENTHAL, supra note 188, at 105 (describing policy of Maricopa County, Arizona, to charge most 
serious possible crime when gun was used). To the extent that prosecutors already routinely charge the 
maximum in particular categories of cases, concerns about prosecutors “upping the ante” in response 
to our hypothetical Bordenkircher II are moot. 
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range of additional means to induce pleas, which might include the 
promise of a favorable sentencing recommendation, an offer to stipulate to 
particular sentencing factors, or an agreement not to pursue civil remedies. 
Because such devices do not involve the formal filing of new charges and 
related transaction costs (arraignment, preliminary hearing, fresh 
discovery demands, and so forth), prosecutors will often find them 
preferable to the tactic of threatening enhanced charges. And, finally, 
because plea deals can usually be reached quickly and easily within the 
standard high-to-low framework, plea-bargaining more frequently follows 
this pattern than the low-to-high approach exemplified by Bordenkircher. 
(By “standard high-to-low,” I mean that initial charges build in some 
bargaining room, but do not encompass every conceivable crime that 
could be charged. I will refer to the latter approach as “super high-to-
low.”) 
With these assumptions in mind, let us now consider potential 
prosecutorial responses to our hypothetical Bordenkircher II.261  
1. Option One: Do Nothing 
Prosecutors might respond to our hypothetical holding in 
Bordenkircher II by charging as they always have. This, in fact, seems a 
likely response in many jurisdictions. Not only is it consistent with the 
recognizable inertia of all social institutions, but it also reflects the fact 
that prosecutors are generally quite successful in setting initial charges in 
such a way as to induce a guilty plea. Given the range of plea-inducement 
tools otherwise available, prosecutors in many—perhaps most—
jurisdictions are unlikely to miss the option of threatening more serious 
charges except in a small number of unusual cases. For many prosecutors, 
the potential for these occasional cases will not justify the costs of 
developing a systematic response to Bordenkircher II. 
To the extent that “doing nothing” is the prosecutorial response of 
choice, the post-Bordenkircher II world would not look dramatically 
different than the present. Most defendants would experience the criminal 
justice system precisely as they do now. Some defendants, however, 
 
 
 261. Although the proposed rule is not, technically, a ban on charge-threats during plea 
negotiations, I assume that prosecutors would treat the rule in that way. Because defense counsel 
would recognize that charging threats were ineffectual, such threats would not carry much plea-
inducement weight. Therefore, prosecutors would have little incentive to make them. Thus, although 
one potential drawback of the rule is that, once a charging threat was made, a prosecutor would be 
unable to adjust charges upward based even on legitimate reasons, such as newly discovered evidence, 
this should not be a serious problem in practice. 
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would be spared threats of enhanced charges. In some of their cases, a plea 
deal will be reached anyway because the prosecutor is willing to make 
sufficient additional concessions to the defendant. In others, the upshot 
will be a trial that would not have otherwise occurred. Overall, the effects 
of Bordenkircher II would look like the effects that the Apprendi Five 
anticipated would flow from their earlier decisions: a few more trials and a 
bit more plea-bargaining leverage for some defendants. Although such 
results are certainly not cost-free to society,262 they do seem consistent 
with the overarching vision of a more robust role for the jury, greater 
limitations on the coercive power of the state, and greater fairness as 
perceived by defendants.263 
2. Option Two: Up the Ante Across the Board 
The Bordenkircher and Goodwin majorities feared that prohibiting 
low-to-high would simply cause prosecutors to switch to a more 
aggressive version of high-to-low, upping the ante across the board with 
tougher initial charges. Recall that, at present, prosecutors do not always 
charge every conceivable crime in every case. Were prosecutors broadly to 
adopt a “super high-to-low” strategy, then our hypothetical holding in 
Bordenkircher II could indeed be accused of perverse consequences. At 
best, cases would simply be resolved on the same terms as they are now, 
albeit sometimes following a different path (high-to-low instead of the 
reverse). At worst, many defendants might actually be harmed in a number 
of respects, such as by facing greater stigma and more onerous bail 
conditions as a result of the higher initial charges.264 
These concerns, however, should be greeted with some skepticism. 
First, as suggested in the previous subsection, there are good reasons to 
doubt whether prosecutors would assume the transaction costs of broad, 
systematic responses to Bordenkircher II, when prosecutors can generally 
 
 
 262. See Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TUL. L. REV. 695, 704–05 (2001) 
(noting social benefits of plea bargains, including reduced costs and reduced time lag between the 
offense and the punishment). 
 263. Even an incremental increase in the number of trials may have great significance in a system 
like ours where trials have become exceedingly rare. See Wright, supra note 197, at 83 n.12 (2005) 
(noting that if acquittals become too rare, then “[they cannot] serve their market discipline function 
during plea negotiation”). 
 264. The Court expressed precisely this concern in United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 378 
n.10 (1982). More onerous bail conditions are perhaps of special concern; they not only increase the 
likelihood of pretrial detention, but may also thereby shape the ultimate disposition of the case. See 
Bibas, supra note 160, at 2492–93 (noting that pretrial detention impairs the defendant’s ability to 
mount a defense and, in small cases, increases pressure on the defendant to take a plea deal quickly). 
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reach comfortable results within the standard high-to-low framework. 
Second, to the extent there is a systematic response, prosecutors will be 
wary of inflating initial charges across the board. As discussed in the 
previous Part, inflating initial charges may make it much harder, in light of 
anchoring and framing effects, for prosecutors ultimately to reach 
negotiated outcomes that are satisfactory to them. Moreover, in light of 
reciprocal fairness tendencies, prosecutors also risk a backlash of 
uncooperative behavior from defendants and defense counsel. 
Finally, to the extent that prosecutors do choose to up the ante across 
the board, we should recognize that this will not necessarily represent an 
unmitigated loss for defendants.265 Although upping the ante would 
produce a period of instability in criminal practice, there would ultimately 
be a new equilibrium in which judges (certainly) and the public (possibly) 
would be able to recognize that charges have been inflated and would 
discount accordingly. For instance, when judges recognize that today’s 
aggravated assault charge was yesterday’s simple assault, and today’s 
attempted murder yesterday’s aggravated assault, then judges will likely 
discount today’s bail conditions, at least to some extent, in order to 
account for the change.266 At the same time, for reasons discussed in the 
previous Part, even when high-to-low and low-to-high produce the same 
outcomes, there is good reason to believe that the two tactics are perceived 
differently by defendants. Given the different ways that losses and gains 
are experienced, defendants might perceive high-to-low as fairer and less 
coercive. Whatever costs defendants bear, those costs should be 
considered in light of the benefits of perceived gains in fairness.267 
 
 
 265. Of course, there are likely some discrete categories of defendants (serious recidivists, 
gangsters, terrorists, and the like) against whom prosecutors are already filing all plausible charges, 
either for public relations purposes or out of a genuine desire to obtain the maximum possible 
sentence. The prosecution of such defendants should be unchanged by Bordenkircher II; there was 
never any room for threatening them with higher charges, so losing the ability to make the threat 
cannot affect the plea-bargaining or litigation process. 
 266. Anchoring effects, however, suggest that the discounting will not be complete. 
 267. Enhanced perceptions of fairness may produce important long-term benefits for both the 
defendant and the community. For instance, in an important body of theoretical and empirical work, 
Professor Tyler and various colleagues have identified a link between perceptions of fair treatment, 
beliefs in the legitimacy of legal institutions, and voluntary deference to the law and legal authorities. 
See, e.g., TYLER & HUO, supra note 215, at xiv–xv, 12. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 
(1972) (“[S]ociety has a further interest in treating the parolee with basic fairness: fair treatment in 
parole revocations will enhance the chance of rehabilitation by avoiding reactions to arbitrariness.”). 
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3. Option Three: Up the Ante Selectively 
If prosecutors do not wish to bear the potential costs of upping the ante 
across they board, they might instead up the ante selectively, targeting 
categories of defendants who tend to be particularly resistant to 
conventional plea inducements within the standard high-to-low 
framework. It is not entirely clear what categories these would be, but one 
category is readily identifiable: defendants who believe themselves 
innocent, or otherwise likely to prevail at trial, are likely particularly 
resistant to standard plea inducements. This tendency may be explained in 
light of framing effects and loss-aversion: whereas the knowingly guilty 
defendant likely welcomes a standard plea deal as a gain, an “innocent” 
defendant will see the agreement to plead guilty to any charge as a loss. 
In light of these considerations, prosecutors in a post-Bordenkircher II 
world would have more of an incentive to determine before the start of 
plea bargaining which defendants have a real claim of innocence or other 
grounds for optimism. However, an early, thorough review of the merits of 
the case by the prosecutor would be a welcome development.268 For 
instance, BLE scholarship suggests that early review would help 
prosecutors better appreciate defendant perspectives before positions 
harden in the charging and negotiation process and thereby facilitate the 
declination or voluntary dismissal of inappropriate charges.269  
These benefits, however, might be offset by an unfortunate effect of 
closer prosecutorial scrutiny in the early stages of the case. Aggressive 
prosecutors anxious to ensure adequate plea-inducement leverage might 
inflate the initial charges against defendants whose optimism is both 
strong and misplaced.270 In these circumstances, whatever negative 
 
 
 268. See Wright & Miller, supra note 255, at 95 (noting benefits of pre-charge screening). 
 269. See Burke, supra note 188, at 1614–15 (“Because the theory of guilt triggers sources of 
cognitive bias, prosecutorial neutrality should be at its peak prior to the prosecutor’s charging decision 
. . . .”); Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and Administrative Rulemaking, 
63 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 602–20 (2002) (discussing empirical evidence supporting theory of cognitive 
consistency, which predicts tendency to hold on to beliefs in face of disconfirming evidence, 
particularly where there has been public commitment to belief). A leading criticism of plea bargaining 
is that it leads to the conviction of innocent defendants. Gazal-Ayal, supra note 227, at 2297. As 
Professor Gazal-Ayal has recently pointed out, the root cause of the problem is that the strength of plea 
inducements leave prosecutors with insufficient incentives to screen out weak cases at the charging 
stage. Id. at 2298–99. Any marginal decrease in the prosecutor’s plea-inducement leverage, as by 
restricting the use of charging threats, should result in some marginal increase in the incentives to 
screen better. 
 270. Professor Schulhofer has also argued that, if prosecutors could overcome information barriers 
to determine which defendants truly believe themselves innocent, they would respond with a more 
aggressive approach to plea inducement. Schulhofer, supra note 14, at 1984. 
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consequences flow from the super high-to-low tactic (e.g., tougher bail 
condition, greater stigma) might effectively be distributed on the basis of 
the sorts of circumstances that cause defendants to take an unjustifiably 
optimistic view of their situation, such as incompetent legal counsel, poor 
cognitive functioning, or simple inexperience with the criminal justice 
system. All of these circumstances are unrelated to the actual severity of 
the crime.  
Although it is possible to identify some categories of defendants as to 
whom prosecutors may wish to inflate initial charges, note that prosecutors 
already have incentives to be unusually aggressive in charging these 
defendants. At present, however, prosecutors may resist these incentives, 
knowing that they retain the ability to threaten increased charges if the 
usual plea inducements prove inadequate. Our hypothetical holding in 
Bordenkircher II would cancel this insurance policy, leaving prosecutors 
somewhat more likely to adopt the super high-to-low strategy. Such a 
change might indeed impose costs on some defendants. Other groups of 
defendants, however, may benefit, particularly to the extent that closer 
pre-charging examination of cases leads prosecutors to decline the more 
dubious ones up front. Moreover, as discussed in the previous subsection, 
costs also need to be weighed in light of perceptions of greater fairness in 
a system that does not employ explicit threats in order to extract waivers 
of constitutional rights. 
4. Option Four: Engage in More Pre-Charge Bargaining 
If a prosecutor fears the loss of a post-charging plea-inducement tool 
(the threat of higher charges), then another logical response would be to 
secure the plea agreement before filing charges. At this point, charges are 
still inchoate, and defendants may not have any clear expectation of what 
they will be; it is accordingly difficult to speak in terms of a “threat to 
increase charges,” and our hypothetical Bordenkircher II rule would be 
inapplicable.  
There are good reasons, however, to doubt that prosecutors would 
routinely conclude plea deals before filing charges. For one thing, no right 
to counsel attaches before the initiation of adversary proceedings,271 and 
prosecutors will not relish the inefficiencies and potential misconduct 
claims arising from direct negotiation with unrepresented lay 
 
 
 271. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984). 
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defendants.272 For another, defendants held in custody are generally 
entitled to a probable cause determination within forty-eight hours of 
arrest.273 There are obvious efficiency benefits to combining this 
determination with the arraignment process, but doing so may leave little 
time for the prosecutor to negotiate a pre-charge deal. In light of these 
sorts of constraints, increased pre-charge bargaining seems most likely in 
two types of cases: (1) white-collar cases in which the defendant is capable 
of securing counsel prior to the initiation of adversary proceedings,274 and 
(2) routine, high-volume cases for which prosecutors may develop 
standard, take-it-or-leave-it plea offers, such as those used by federal 
prosecutors in illegal reentry cases.275 
Increased pre-charge bargaining would not necessarily be either unfair 
to defendants or unwelcome as a matter of policy. An early deal 
compresses the period of uncertainty faced by the defendant and may 
lessen the likelihood that defendants will develop firm expectations as to 
how the case will be handled that are later dashed. Additionally, because 
an early deal relieves the prosecutor of various procedural burdens, such as 
the need to obtain an indictment or show probable cause at a preliminary 
hearing, the prosecutor may be willing to pay a premium for the 
defendant’s agreement to plead guilty.276 Although an early deal may 
mean that the defendant (or the prosecutor, for that matter) may lack 
important information that would later come to light, this cost may be 
offset by the benefit of negotiations that occur outside the shadow of the 
 
 
 272. See, e.g., Wright & Miller, supra note 255, at 78–79 (attributing absence of pre-charge 
bargaining in New Orleans to lack of public defender between bail hearing and arraignment). For a 
discussion of the burdens facing prosecutors who deal with unrepresented defendants, see Ben 
Kempinen, The Ethics of Prosecutor Contact with the Unrepresented Defendant, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 1147, 1150–51 (2006). 
 273. Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991). 
 274. See Lynch, supra note 256, at 2126 (discussing routine pre-indictment contact between 
prosecutors and defense counsel in white-collar cases). 
 275. See O’Hear, supra note 18, at 789 (describing federal “early disposition” programs). Support 
for the prediction of marginal, but not dramatic, increases in pre-charge bargaining comes from 
empirical research on the effects of implementing the federal sentencing guidelines. Under the 
guidelines, judges were supposed to reject charge bargains that undermined the purposes of the new 
sentencing regime. Ahmed E. Taha, The Equilibrium Effect of Legal Rule Changes: Are the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines Being Circumvented?, 21 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 251, 251–52 (2001). 
However, charge bargains are difficult to detect if they are struck prior to charging. Id. at 252. 
Therefore, as under our hypothetical Bordenkircher II, implementation of the guidelines gave 
prosecutors wishing to maximize their discretion an incentive to increase pre-charge bargaining. Id. 
Empirical research of actual charging practices indicates just such an adjustment, but only in “a few 
percent of cases.” Id. 
 276. For instance, in the federal early disposition programs, defendants receive a special 
“downward departure” under the federal sentencing guidelines. O’Hear, supra note 18. 
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cognitive bias that arises when the prosecutor publicly commits to a 
particular set of charges and a particular theory of the case.277 Finally, to 
the extent that early plea deals reduce the transaction costs borne by 
prosecutors, judges, and public defenders, more resources will be available 
for other purposes (including the potential increase in trials resulting from 
a prohibition on threats of increased charges).278 
5. Option Five: Do More Sentence Bargaining 
If prosecutors lose some flexibility in using their charging power for 
plea-inducement purposes, some may respond with greater use of 
sentence-related inducements.279 Depending on the particulars of 
sentencing law and practice in the jurisdiction, such inducements may take 
any of a number of different forms. For instance, in order to induce a plea, 
a prosecutor may offer to stand silent at sentencing or to recommend a 
particular sentence that the defendant would view as a favorable outcome. 
Alternatively, in some jurisdictions, a plea agreement may be made 
contingent on a specific sentence or sentencing range.280 Or, more 
modestly, a prosecutor might offer to stipulate to a specific sentencing 
factor, such as the amount of drugs or a mitigating role in the offense, or 
agree not to seek a sentence enhancement on the basis of a particular 
factor. In all such forms of “sentence bargaining,” the prosecutor makes an 
offer or threat relating to the selection of a specific sentence within the 
applicable statutory maximum. 
Because sentence bargaining is already common in many 
jurisdictions,281 and not a practicable alternative in others,282 it is far from 
 
 
 277. See Stern, supra note 269, at 640–43 (providing justification based on cognitive consistency 
theory for analogous practice of “regulatory negotiation,” in which stakeholders negotiate over a 
proposed rule before rule is formally published). 
 278. Professor Moss has made a similar point in arguing for more regulation of confidential 
settlements in civil litigation: such regulation, he predicts, would lead to more prefiling settlements, 
which would reduce overall transaction costs. Scott Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic 
Analysis of Confidential Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=921463. 
 279. To be sure, charging-related inducements affect the ultimate sentence by triggering a 
particular statutory sentencing range. By “sentence-related inducements,” I mean inducements that 
affect the selection of a sentence within that statutory range. 
 280. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C). 
 281. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 
NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1285 (1997) (estimating that plea bargaining results in circumvention of federal 
sentencing guidelines in twenty to thirty-five percent of cases). 
 282. For instance, in jurisdictions without sentencing guidelines and with a strong tradition of 
judicial control of sentencing, the prosecutor’s sentencing-related bargaining chips will have little 
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clear that a ban on Bordenkircher-style threats would meaningfully 
increase frequency of the practice. To the extent the practice would 
increase, some defendants might prefer the change, which would 
potentially leave them with a perception of greater control over the 
sentencing process and greater certainty as to the outcome. On the other 
hand, there is cause for legitimate concern over sentence bargaining. The 
practice diminishes the visibility, and hence accountability, of the 
sentencing process, and may lead to unwarranted sentencing disparities 
between similarly situated offenders. Additionally, threats to seek sentence 
enhancements, even within a statutory maximum, may be no less coercive 
and perceived as no less unfair than threats to seek an increased maximum. 
It is not clear, then, that defendants would gain from a switch on the 
margins from Bordenkircher-style charge bargaining to similar threat-
based sentence bargaining. At the same time, there seems to be no 
compelling reason to conclude that a switch from charge threats to 
sentence threats would constitute a loss for defendants. 
6. Option Six: Make Implicit Threats 
If prosecutors lose the ability to make express charging threats, then 
some might attempt to make implicit threats by routinely pursuing 
additional charges against defendants who refuse plea deals. The 
prosecutor would hope to develop a reputation for this practice among 
defense lawyers, so that defendants would be routinely counseled to take 
the prosecutor’s offer. This would be an unfortunate practice, perhaps even 
worse than an express Bordenkircher-style threat, which at least has the 
virtue of giving the trial-bound defendant a clear opportunity to avoid the 
“threatened” charge. 
There are some natural checks on this practice. The transaction costs of 
new charges may deter some prosecutors from routine charge 
enhancements. Others will avoid the practice because it offends their sense 
of fairness. Still others will be reluctant to subvert a clearly articulated 
constitutional norm of no threats.  
In order to buttress these tendencies, however, courts should be willing 
to entertain “implicit threat” claims from defendants who were subject to 
pretrial charge increases. These claims might proceed along two lines. 
 
 
value. See, e.g., KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN 
THE FEDERAL COURTS 80 (1998) (“[In the pre-guidelines federal system] in many districts . . . 
prosecutors generally refrained from rendering specific sentencing recommendations to the judge, and 
the judge would neither elicit nor condone such recommendations.”). 
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First, the prosecutor might be required to provide a neutral explanation for 
the charge increase. For reasons described in an earlier Section, however, 
this sort of requirement is not likely to provide a meaningful check on 
prosecutors. Thus, defendants should be permitted to present evidence of 
past practices to establish a pattern of routine charge enhancements, either 
on the individual prosecutor level or the office level. Unfortunately, there 
is no obvious line to be drawn here, and courts will not have an easy time 
deciding when the rate of charge enhancements reaches a level sufficient 
to demonstrate “a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness.”283 Just permitting 
the claims, however, may have a salutary effect, as prosecutors will 
undoubtedly wish to avoid coming close to the line and thereby prompting 
burdensome collateral litigation.284 Prosecutors could easily do so by 
exercising care in their initial charging decisions and making a habit of 
standing by those initial decisions (and, as indicated above, improved 
initial charging is desirable on a number of grounds).285 
7. Summary 
In weighing the actual consequences of the hypothetical holding in 
Bordenkircher II, it may be helpful to distinguish among three categories 
of defendants: (1) those who would not have been subject in any event to 
Bordenkircher-style charging threats, (2) those who would have been 
subject to such threats and pled guilty, and (3) those who would have been 
subject to such threats and gone to trial. Those in the first category will not 
be much affected by the holding. There may be some adverse 
consequences on the margins to the extent that prosecutors respond by 
upping the initial charging ante. However, these effects are not likely to be 
profound or widespread, and may be offset by the benefits of, for instance, 
increased pre-charge investigation and bargaining. 
Those in the second category will be spared charging threats. Some 
will go to trial as a result. Of these, some will win, and some will lose; 
and, of those who lose, some may actually be worse off, from a sentencing 
 
 
 283. See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 375 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). 
 284. I assume that the defendant would have to make some sort of minimal threshold showing in 
order to trigger full-blown litigation of the issue. This showing should not, however, disingenuously 
require the defendant effectively to carry his burden on the merits before getting discovery, as the 
Court has unfortunately required in an analogous context. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 
456 (1996). 
 285. See Wright & Miller, supra note 255, at 32–34 (arguing for early and careful case 
assessment). 
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standpoint, than if they had taken advantage of the plea deal offered to 
them.286 Still, all who go to trial will have the advantage of a process they 
preferred to a bargained resolution, and all should perceive greater fairness 
than in a system that promises a right to a trial but expressly penalizes 
those who invoke it. 
Some in the second category will opt, even in the absence of a charging 
threat, to plead guilty, perhaps as a result of sentencing threats, enhanced 
initial charges, or a simple failure of nerve. On the whole, one imagines 
that these defendants will be better off insofar as Bordenkircher II 
removes one, sometimes quite powerful, device from the prosecutor’s 
plea-inducement toolbox. Although some defendants may suffer a net loss 
(e.g., by facing higher initial charges), there are good reasons to doubt that 
such results will be widespread. In general, a prosecutor’s loss of one 
source of plea-inducement leverage should strengthen, not weaken, the 
defendant’s negotiating position. 
Those in the third category should most clearly benefit from 
Bordenkircher II. These defendants are bound for trial regardless of the 
prosecutor’s best efforts to the contrary; the only question is what charges 
they will face. Under Bordenkircher II, those charges will often be of 
lesser severity than under Bordenkircher I. To be sure, some will face the 
same charges they would have otherwise faced because the prosecutor will 
have upped the ante in the initial charges. But, again, there are good 
reasons to doubt that such results will be universal. Many category-three 
defendants will unambiguously benefit from Bordenkircher II, and few or 
none will unambiguously suffer. 
These defendants, moreover, are defendants for whom we should feel a 
particular solicitude. By their determination to go to trial, the category-
three defendants are likely signaling one or more of the following 
conditions: a firm belief in their innocence, unusual optimism regarding 
their chances of winning at trial, extraordinary bullheadedness, ineffective 
legal counsel, and/or an expectation that the results of a conviction will be 
especially onerous. Under Bordenkricher I, as the dissenters in the case 
suggested,287 defendants are effectively penalized for these sorts of 
circumstances, even though they have no legitimate bearing on the 
defendants’ blameworthiness. Indeed, if anything, the defendant’s firm 
 
 
 286. The judge, for instance, may impose a “trial penalty” on the defendant at sentencing. See, 
e.g., Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences After Guilty 
Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 961–62 (2005). 
 287. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 368 n.2 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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belief in his own innocence should raise serious questions about the 
defendant’s culpability. 
In sum, there are good reasons to believe that Bordenkircher II will 
have real effects on the outcomes of some cases. This is not a matter of 
“doctrinaire formalism” in the sense that any potential consequences of the 
holding will be swamped by prosecutorial circumvention. Nor is it a 
matter of doctrinaire formalism in the sense of perverse consequences. 
Although one must concede a likelihood that some defendants will suffer 
worse outcomes as a result of the holding, there are good reasons to doubt 
that these effects will be widespread. Other defendants should be 
unambiguously better off, and some of these are among the most 
vulnerable in the system. 
There may also be broader, if more subtle, benefits. The hypothetical 
holding in Bordenkircher II would provide prosecutors with additional 
incentives to do more investigation and negotiation before filing charges. 
This may promote more judicious charging decisions, more efficient 
negotiation and litigation processes, and reduced uncertainty for 
defendants and victims. Bordenkircher II would also invite prosecutors to 
reconsider whether they overvalue the goal of speedy convictions, and 
perhaps contribute to stronger due process norms in connection with plea 
inducement. Finally, Bordenkircher II would signal to defendants that the 
system takes constitutional rights seriously and that even prosecutors 
operate in a rule-bound fashion. This may strengthen respect for the 
system and promote compliance with the law.288 
V. CONCLUSION 
Apprendi’s critics can be forgiven for using the “doctrinaire 
formalism” label: there is a real gap in the Apprendi decisions between the 
rhetoric and the rule. The decisions amount to incrementalism disguised as 
absolutism. They give the appearance of absolutism because of their 
frequent invocation of a romantic ideal of the jury as a check on 
government oppression, because of their express rejection of efficiency 
and uniformity as legitimate grounds on which to limit access to juries, 
 
 
 288. See supra note 267. Although this Article most directly addresses the Apprendi Five, the 
same considerations that would justify their overturning Bordenkircher would also justify 
experimental regulation of charging threats by state and local legislatures and executive authorities. 
Such experiments would offer the ancillary benefit of empirical data to aid in the assessment of costs 
and benefits of different regulatory approaches. Such data, in turn, may contribute to the elaboration or 
modification of the constitutional rule proposed here. Cf. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 237 
(2005) (noting Court’s need to adjust to “new circumstances” in order to preserve jury-trial right). 
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and because their legal test permits no case-by-case balancing of interests. 
Yet, this apparent absolutism is an illusion. The decisions expressly 
contemplate both discretionary sentencing by judges and negotiated guilty 
pleas. In a world in which these practices are allowed to persist, jury fact-
finding for sentencing purposes will always be the exception, not the 
norm. 
The Court’s failure to live up to its absolutist rhetoric does not 
necessarily mean that the Court is failing to advance the basic values 
embraced by the rhetoric. And the Apprendi decisions do indeed provide 
for at least incremental progress. The decisions limit the range of 
legislative options in structuring sentencing systems. Denied their 
preferred choice, many states will adopt jury fact-finding (indeed, many 
have already done so). And while many defendants will surrender their 
right to such fact-finding, not all will. Apprendi and its progeny should 
therefore result in at least an incremental increase in reliance on juries for 
sentencing purposes. And in those cases in which defendants do bargain 
away their jury rights, they will often be able to obtain additional 
concessions in the process, thereby marginally diminishing prosecutorial 
domination of the system. In jurisdictions that do not adopt jury fact-
finding, the likely response will be discretionary sentencing. Although a 
switch to discretionary sentencing does not necessarily enhance 
democratic control, it also incrementally advances the ideal of checks and 
balances in the exercise of state power. Thus, although the Apprendi 
decisions do not require states to adopt sentencing systems that fully 
embody “common law values,” they do steer states in the right direction. 
In this Article, I have suggested how this type of incrementalism, in the 
service of the same underlying values, might lead to a new approach to the 
regulation of Bordenkircher-style charging threats. The goal here is not to 
steer legislatures in the right direction, but to steer prosecutors. In some 
cases, the prosecutor’s preferred choice is to charge the defendant one way 
and then threaten enhanced charges in order to extract a guilty plea. 
Denied the opportunity to do so, prosecutors may respond in any of a 
number of different ways, some considerably more attractive than others. 
On the whole, though, there is good reason to believe that the rule 
proposed here will result in an incremental increase in the number of jury 
trials, an incremental decrease in the scope of prosecutorial domination, 
and an enhanced perception among defendants that the system operates in 
a fair, predictable, and respectful manner. 
One drawback to incrementalism, of course, is that the line drawing 
will always seem a bit arbitrary. There is always an argument that some 
other increment best strikes the balance between protecting the right at 
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issue, minimizing disruptions, and preserving flexibility. Although a 
number of such arguments may be made in the present context, one in 
particular stands out as requiring some commentary. The most troubling 
limitation to the Court’s incrementalism in the Apprendi line of cases is 
the exception for mandatory minimums, as confirmed in Harris.289 For 
purposes of symmetry, I have reluctantly incorporated the exception into 
the proposed Bordenkircher II rule. 
The Harris exception is unfortunate, but not such a gaping loophole as 
to wholly undermine the Apprendi rule. Although some jurisdictions may 
adopt more mandatory minimums, or convert sentencing guidelines into 
mandatory minimums, in response to the Apprendi decisions, not all 
jurisdictions have done so or (in light of prison budget concerns, if nothing 
else) are likely to do so.290 Moreover, the Harris exception may be 
exploited only to the extent that the mandatory minimum lies within the 
statutory maximum. The Harris exception thus carries its greatest 
significance in cases in which the offense of conviction provides a 
generous statutory maximum, but has much less room to operate in the 
context of less serious offenses. For instance, in Bordenkircher itself, 
although the Habitual Criminal Act was framed as a mandatory minimum, 
it would not have escaped the proposed charging threats rule because the 
minimum (life) far exceeded the maximum for the underlying offense (ten 
years). 
That said, it would be preferable to reject the Harris exception in both 
the sentencing factor and the charging threats contexts.291 Indeed, this 
would not really be inconsistent with the views of the Apprendi Five, four 
of whom dissented in Harris, but only inconsistent with the views of 
Justice Scalia. He should reconsider.292 The political constraints on the 
adoption of mandatory minimums are not nearly as reassuring as the 
political constraints on the adoption of inverted sentencing. Mandatory 
minimums further empower prosecutors, especially when they can be 
triggered through the relaxed procedures available for “sentencing 
factors,” which is inconsistent with the checks-and-balances ideal. And 
 
 
 289. See supra Part II.B. 
 290. See Wright, supra note 180, at 408–09 (discussing reasons that states “have shown relative 
restraint when it comes to mandatory minimum sentences”). Moreover, evasion efforts based on the 
conversion of guidelines into mandatory minimums may run into a number of serious constitutional 
objections. Berman, supra note 189, at 360–62. 
 291. Fortunately, in light of Justice Breyer’s reluctant concurrence in Harris and other recent 
developments, there is good reason to believe that the decision will not long stand. Id. at 359–60. 
 292. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604 (2003) (Scalia, J, dissenting) (noting obligation of 
judges to “carry things to their logical conclusion”). 
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Blakely’s fairness objections to out-of-the-blue sentence enhancements 
seem no less compelling as to minimums than as to maximums. 
The plea-inducement system—what Judge Lynch aptly terms “our 
administrative system of criminal justice”293—is likely with us for the long 
haul, and that is not necessarily a bad thing. The challenge is to develop 
legal rules so as to bring some semblance of checks and balances to the 
system and to dispel the perception (and sometimes the reality) of 
momentous decisions about human liberty being dictated by prosecutors 
according to their own whims, biases, and personal convenience.294 With 
or without a mandatory minimum exception, overturning Bordenkircher 
would be a very good place to start. 
 
 
 293. Lynch, supra note 256, at 2118. 
 294. See O’Hear, supra note 18, at 805–11 (discussing unchecked prosecutorial discretion as a 
form of dignitary harm to defendants); Barkow, supra note 231, at 1050 (arguing that analysis of plea 
bargaining should focus more on balance of power issues). 
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